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THE  BEHAVIOR of the U.S. stock market over the past decade has puzzled 
both academic and lay observers. Recent experience casts doubt on the 
traditional belief that common stocks are an ideal hedge against inflation. 
Comparisons of the cyclical peak years of  1959,  1968, and 1979 are re- 
vealing. The total nominal return  from investing in the market portfolio of 
common stocks has a geometric average of just 4.7 percent a year for the 
1968-79  period, far less than the rise in consumer prices of 7.0 percent 
for the same period. By contrast, stock returns from 1959 to 1968 aver- 
aged 9.3 percent while prices rose only 2.1 percent a year. In real terms, 
stock prices at the end of 1978  (as represented by the Standard & Poor's 
500)  were about half of their historic peak level of  1968.  For no other 
ten-year period, including the Great Depression, have stocks performed 
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so  poorly. This dismal record is only partially explained by aggregate 
profit figures. Although  the  rate of  growth of  real after-tax corporate 
profits for domestic manufacturers, with correction for both inventory 
valuation and capital consumption adjustments, has decelerated some- 
what (from 2.8 percent a year for 1959-68  to 1.6 percent for 1968-79), 
the recent growth rate is  not  significantly different from the  long-run 
growth rate of real corporate profits (1.9  percent for 1948-79).  Clearly 
the ratio of share prices to after-tax and inflation-adjusted earnings has 
shown a significant  and unexplained decline. 
The negative correlation between observed stock prices and inflation 
in recent years has been widely documented.' One possible explanation 
of this phenomenon, emphasized by Martin Feldstein and others, is that 
under U.S. tax laws inflation increases the real tax burden on corporate 
capital.' The tax effect is primarily due to historical cost depreciation and 
taxation of nominal capital gains; however, it does not easily explain the 
decrease in market values relative to after-tax earnings. Furthermore, not 
all  tax  effects  of  inflation are negative.  Inflation-induced increases in 
nominal interest payments are fully deductible even though they are in 
effect repayment of principal. Measuring the quantitative importance of 
these tax considerations is difficult because changes in inflation have ef- 
fects that are spread over the future, and hence could be expected to show 
up in stock values before being reflected in after-tax earnings. Feldstein 
does not believe that the increases in the real tax burden are sufficient to 
account for the current depressed level of the market. He cites also the 
"transitory"  reduction in before-tax profitability, higher tax rates on capi- 
tal gains, and increased uncertainty associated in part with an increasing 
ratio of debt to equity. He also admits "the share price level may therefore 
have overshot its equilibrium level."3 Franco  Modigliani  and Richard 
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Cohn also question market efficiency in light of recent experience.4 They 
explain the market's decline by "two major, inflation-induced errors in 
evaluating corporate assets."5  Equity holders fail to take into account the 
real depreciation of nominal corporate liabilities and commit the addi- 
tional error of discounting equity earnings at the nominal interest rate 
rather  than at the theoretically indicated real rate. 
The current depressed level of the stock market is not the only puzzling 
aspect of the U.S. equities market. Stock prices have always been volatile 
in comparison with aggregate earnings and dividends that exhibit relative 
stability. Stephen LeRoy  and Richard Porter have investigated whether 
the observed standard deviation of total annual returns of common stocks 
of over 22 percent is consistent with the simple model of stock valuation 
(equal  to  the present discounted  value  of  expected  future earnings).6 
They conclude that the observed variability is between three and four 
times as large as that suggested by a model of earnings projections con- 
sistent with the observed time series properties of  earnings and a con- 
stant discount rate. Robert Shiller reaches a similar conclusion. He finds 
that the informational content of aggregate dividend changes can explain 
only one-fourth of the changes in aggregate share value.7 
Equities, of course, are only one of the claims against corporate capital, 
and some  events-for  example,  unanticipated changes in the expected 
rate of inflation-redistribute  earnings between bond and equity holders. 
Although the behavior of the stock market is a dominant concern to some 
investors, from society's perspective the more relevant concern is how 
the market values the capital stock, the major component of national and 
private wealth. Further, empirical studies suggest that the market value of 
capital relative to its replacement costs is an important determinant of 
physical investment in capital. The market value of capital, defined as the 
sum of the market values of the equity and bond claims against it, has 
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shown the same decline relative to the sum of after-tax earnings and inter- 
est as the stock market itself. Similarly, the ratio of the market value of 
capital to  its replacement cost,  q,  has dramatically decreased from its 
peak in the mid-1960s. 
No  study has attempted to  decompose  systematically movements in 
either share values or the market value of capital into movements of the 
factors necessary for valuation theories. Broadly speaking, three elements 
are required: expectations of future dividends or earnings, the pure rate- 
of-time  discount  appropriate to  risk-free streams, and the  adjustment 
necessary for risk in uncertain environments. Clearly, no theory asserts 
that these factors remain constant through time or that they evolve deter- 
ministically. To  assess  the usefulness of  models  of  rational valuation, 
these factors must first be quantified. This requires more than simply an 
examination of aggregate earnings and market values, because if risk and 
time discounts are allowed to vary without restriction, the model is under- 
identified. 
In this paper we examine cross-sectional evidence on the valuation of 
firms at different times to estimate the time discounts and risk adjustments 
necessary to explain observed market values. Cross-sectional variation in 
the relevant measures of the riskiness of earnings streams with the same 
time sequence of expected returns enables us to identify separately risk 
and time discount factors. 
In  the  discussion below  we  describe the method of  calculating the 
present discounted value of future cash flows for the  187 firms in our 
sample. This involves calculation of the age structure of each firm's capi- 
tal, its current replacement value, and its rates of return for each firm for 
the 1958-77  period. We also compute an aggregate series of gross and 
net rates of  return and compare these estimates with those  previously 
published. We then present the method for calculating the market values 
of firms; the corresponding q are also shown. To explore the sensitivity 
of our results to variations in assumptions about expectations formation, 
we use ten different methods of forecasting future earnings. We report 
internal rate of return and the ratio of market value to present discounted 
value for several discount rates. Finally, we discuss the measurement and 
valuation of  risk and report on regressions that attempt to explain the 
deviations of market value from present discounted value in terms of a 
variety of variables, including those attempting to measure inflation and 
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Intrinsic Valuation of the Firm 
We begin by assuming that the market value of a firm reflects its "in- 
trinsic value," defined as the present discounted value of expected cash 
flows, adjusted for risk. These expected cash flows are assumed to reflect 
the expected before-tax gross rate of return on capital, amount of capital 
at each future date, payment of taxes, purchases of new capital and sales of 
debt. By using a before-tax gross rate of return and separately calculating 
taxes, we are able to capture explicitly the intertemporal and nonneutral 
interaction of inflation and the tax law. An increase in the rate of inflation, 
for example, has little effect on the real value of tax depreciation in the 
first year; the discrepancy between historical and replacement cost depre- 
ciation grows over time until it reaches an asymptote. The present dis- 
counted value of these effects is captured in the intrinsic value. 
The first assumption we make in deriving our estimates of  intrinsic 
value or the present discounted value of the firm is that a firm's capital 
consists of  a portfolio  of plant, equipment, and land of  different ages. 
Plant and equipment are taken as "one hoss shays" or "light bulbs"-they 
are assumed to remain fully productive until they suddenly fail. The date 
of failure or retirement is estimated from depreciation data. The future 
productivity of the capital is uncertain, but it is independent of age. No 
explicit account is taken of technological progress. 
We compute two measures of intrinsic value. The first, called cash-out 
intrinsic value, assumes that the value of a firm reflects only the returns 
on  existing capital.  Future investments have zero  economic  rent-the 
present discounted value of their expected returns is equal to their costs. 
Any  site  rents reflecting patents, monopoly  position,  and so  forth are 
associated with the existing capital. The second measure, the constant- 
capital intrinsic value of a firm, is based on the assumption that each unit 
of capital is replaced at the end of its economic  lifetime. The intrinsic 
value is the present discounted value of the cash flows generated minus the 
funds necessary to purchase the replacement units. New and old units earn 
the same real before-tax rate of return, and thus any economic rents asso- 
ciated with the old units continue in the new. A fraction of replacement 
investment is financed by the sale of debt. We assume that new issuance of 
debt is proportional to new investment. The fraction of new debt to new 
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interest payments match the actual interest payments. The  assumption 
that firms maintain a constant ratio of  new debt to investment implies 
that the tax saving from increased inflation is less than in Feldstein's cal- 
culations, in which savings are taken to be proportional to outstanding 
nominal debt. In our calculations the real value of debt per unit of capital 
declines with increased inflation, partly offsetting the higher nominal in- 
terest rates associated with any given level of real debt. 
These are only two of many possible ways to assess the fundamental 
value of a firm, and each involves rather strong assumptions. In the cash- 
out case, any new investment is assumed to break even; the present value 
of the firm is solely a reflection of past investment decisions. In the con- 
stant-capital case, new capital earns the same gross rate of return as old 
capital, and firms invest sufficiently to maintain the capital stock, whether 
or not it is profitable. Neither case allows the amount of investment to 
depend on its profitability, and therefore both represent lower bounds on 
the economic value of the firm. The calculation of intrinsic value itself is 
obviously  sensitive to  our assumptions about the processes  generating 
future rates of return. It also depends crucially on the estimated composi- 
tion, useful life, and age structure of the firm's real assets. In the constant- 
capital case, intrinsic value is not as sensitive to our estimates of lifetime 
and capital composition as in the cash-out case, but it is sensitive to our 
estimates of the replacement cost of capital that wears out. 
The assumption that capital is a one hoss shay with returns to a unit 
of capital independent of its age is artificial. Moreover, it does  not ex- 
plicitly take into account obsolescence, probably the most important  factor 
in determining actual lifetimes. Ignoring obsolescence leads to an under- 
estimate of the returns on new capital and an overestimate of the returns 
on old. With a positive discount rate this tends to give a downward bias 
to the estimated discounted value and underevaluation of firms with new 
capital as compared to those with old. 
In principle it is possible to test the importance of some of these mis- 
specifications. Direct information is available on the age structure and 
replacement cost of the capital stock. The importance of long-lived in- 
tangibles is more difficult  to test because they cannot be measured directly. 
Information on industrial structure-concentration  ratios and so forth- 
could be taken as a proxy for such rents and used to explain the gross 
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CALCULATING  AGE  STRUCTURE  AND  REPLACEMENT  VALUE 
OF  CORPORATE  CAPITAL  STOCK 
To determine the age composition of the existing capital stock for each 
firm for each year from the data available we make two additional assump- 
tions.  First, there are only two types of  capital goods:  equipment and 
plant plus land  (assumed to be used in fixed proportions).  Both types 
are taken to be one hoss shays. Second, the proportion of equipment in 
the gross investment by  a specific firm, fi,  is  constant throughout the 
sample period. 
The useful lifetime of each firm's equipment and plant is determined 
from its book depreciation and capital stock reported in  1975  Security 
and Exchange Commission 10-K reports. These lifetimes were taken as 
constant for the entire sample period, 1958-77.  Lifetimes are calculated 
by assuming that the firms used straight-line depreciation for book pur- 
poses. The proportion of new investment that is equipment, f j, was in- 
ferred from the firm's actual investment history and the depreciation and 
gross capital stock it reported in 1975. We know that straight-line depreci- 
ation (dropping the i superscript) implies 
Dep75  = fe  eE  +(1f  L) 
Lp 
where 
Dep75  =  1975 depreciation 
I75-  =  the total investment in current dollars in year 1975 -i 
Le, Lp =  equipment  life  and  plant  life,  respectively. 
We also have 
Le  Lp 
GK75  =  fe  I75-i+  (1  -  fe)  I75-i, 
where GK75 is the book value of gross capital stock in 1975. Using data 
from the Compustat file, this can be solved forfe: 
fe  GK75-  Lp  Dep7s 
fe  =  (r::KLp)  Lj 
{  L-  I75-i 
As  a  simple test of  this procedure we  compare the  implied depre- 
ciation year by year with that actually reported. The ratio of the implied 
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from 0.93  in  1967 to  1.02 in 1976.  Over the entire sample the ratio is 
0.98.  There is, however, substantial variation among firms around these 
averages; the effect of these errors on our results is estimated below. The 
average depreciation life for equipment for our firms is 14.5 years, while 
for plant it is 35.0 years. 
Because  the  Compustat  data  covers  only  the  1958-77  period,  we 
are forced to create a "synthetic" investment history for each firm be- 
fore  1958.  The time pattern of investment in the years before  1958  is 
derived by assuming that the ratio of a firm's investment to aggregate in- 
vestment changed at a constant rate 0. A firm's 0 is obtained by solving 
the following equation to equate the implicit gross capital stock to the ac- 
tual capital stock in 1958: 
Lp-1 
GK58  =  I58 +  (1  -  fe)  A(58-Lp+i)eO(Lp-i) 
Lp-1 
+e  A(58-Lp+i)e 
i=Le+l 
where 
At  -  X'A8gI  ivt 
Agg IMV58  +  Agg Inv59 X Agg mv, 
and Agg Inv, is aggregate investment of nonfinancial corporations in year 
t. This procedure yields a synthetic pattern of plant and equipment invest- 
ment and composition  for the L,  years before  1958  that is consistent 
with the firm's  stated 1958 gross capital stock. 
The data, actual and synthetic, are used to estimate for each year the 
age and composition of the capital stock for each firm. This in turn is used 
to compute an estimate of replacement cost in current dollars and true 
economic depreciation, also in current dollars. The procedure is as fol- 
lows. The age structure for each year after 1958 is derived by aging the 
structure from the preceding year, adding new investments (from avail- 
able data),  subtracting estimated retirements, RET,  and scaling the re- 
sult by writing off a portion of the stocks. Write-offs, WO, which include 
sales of plant and equipment, are therefore given by 
WOt  =  GKt -  GKt+j +  It -  RET. 
We assume that the amount of equipment and plant plus land of each vin- 
tage written off is proportional to the existing stock. Retirements are the 
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In addition to plant and equipment, the real physical capital of the firm 
includes inventories and other assets (principally interests in unconsoli- 
dated subsidiaries).  The  book  value of  inventories for firms using the 
last in, first out  (LIFO)  method of inventory valuation is significantly 
different from market value in times of general price inflation. Firms using 
the first in, first out (FIFO)  method, however, state inventories at close 
to market value. 
The inventory  methods used by firms are listed on the Compustat file 
in order of importance. To determine the market value of inventories for 
those  who  report two  methods, we  assume, somewhat arbitrarily, that 
two-thirds of inventories are by the first of the two methods, one-third by 
the second. Similar fractional assumptions (one-half, one-third, one-sixth) 
are made when three methods are used. We keep track of the stocks of 
both FIFO and LIFO inventories by vintage in determining market value. 
If a firm liquidates inventories in a given year, we draw on both stocks ac- 
cording to our assumed proportions, depleting the oldest FIFO and the 
newest LIFO  stocks first. If the firm accumulates inventories, they are 
allocated to LIFO and FIFO stocks in these same proportions. To imple- 
ment this technique, the market value of inventories is taken to be the 
same as the book value in the first year of our sample, 1958. 
Other assets are carried on the books of firms at historical acquisition 
cost and we treat them like LIFO inventories. Their market value is up- 
dated by the same technique used for LIFO inventories. Again, market 
value is considered to be equal to the stated value in 1958. 
CALCULATING  RATE  OF  RETURN 
Our estimate of  the replacement value of the firm's physical capital 
stock is the sum of the current dollar value of plant and equipment net of 
depreciation, plus the current dollar value of inventories and other assets. 
Gross capital represents this replacement value (net of write-offs and re- 
tirements) without adjustment for depreciation. 
Because we are interested in the total return to capital rather than the 
return to stockholders alone, we aggregate the following sources of capi- 
tal income to determine gross cash flows: corporate (equity)  net income 
(after corporate income tax, before extraordinary  items and discontinued 
operations),  total reported interest expense, and book-value  (reported) 
depreciation, minus inventory valuation adjustment (for firms  using FIFO 462  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1980 
inventory valuation), and minus the imputed interest income (prime rate 
applied to net short-term  financial assets). 
The inventory valuation adjustment, IVA,  excludes from earnings the 
capital gains on existing inventories. With a constant inventory-sales ratio 
this is approximately equal to the difference between the replacement cost 
of  goods  sold  from inventories  and the  book  value  used  to  calculate 
earnings: 
IVA, =  M Inv,-,  -  I)  X (FIFO proportion), 
where M Inv,-,  is the market value of inventories for the previous year. 
The  price index used for this calculation is the implicit GNP  deflator 
for inventories. Imputed interest income is subtracted so that the gross 
cash flow corresponds to  the return to physical capital only,  assuming 
that the valuation of financial assets can be treated independently. The 
returns to "good will" and other intangibles are attributed to capital. 
The after-tax gross rate of return in each period is defined by 
GCF 
t'G =  X~ 
KG 
where GCF is gross cash flows and K,  is the current gross value of the 
plant, land, and equipment plus adjusted inventories and adjusted other 
assets. As previously mentioned, it is assumed that the gross rate of return 
in a specific year is the same for capital of all ages. Because it is assumed 
that the remaining life of the existing capital stock is known with certainty, 
the major source of uncertainty about future returns comes from uncer- 
tainty about the gross return. 
The after-tax net rate of return as usually defined is only an approxima- 
tion to the internal rate of return for our technology. It is given by 
GCF -  AD 
rN  -  KN 
rKN 
where AD  is depreciation at replacement cost, calculated from the de- 
rived age  structure and composition  of  the  capital stock  as described 
above, and KN is the adjusted net plant, land, and equipment, plus ad- 
justed inventories and adjusted other assets in current dollars. 
The calculations above were performed on a sample of 187 firms using 
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Table  1.  Annual Rates of Return on Nonfinancial Corporate Capital,  1958-77a 
Percent 
Brainard-Shoven-  Weiss  Feldsteini-Sutmmers  Nordhlaus 
Year  rN  rG  RG  RN  RG  RN  rN 
1958  6.5  8.6  11.9  8.5  9.7  10.4  5.4 
1959  7.3  9.1  13.1  10.7  11.1  13.0  6.8 
1960  6.9  8.8  12.5  9.9  10.6  12.0  6.3 
1961  6.9  8.8  12.3  9.8  10.6  11.8  6.3 
1962  7.3  9.1  12.8  11.2  11.6  13.5  7.9 
1963  7.8  9.4  13.3  11.9  12.0  14.0  8.1 
1964  8.5  9.9  13.8  12.8  12.6  15.0  9.1 
1965  9.3  10.5  14.6  13.7  13.2  16.3  10.0 
1966  8.7  10.3  14.3  13.4  13.2  16.1  9.9 
1967  7.9  9.8  13.2  11.9  12.2  14.0  8.8 
1968  8.0  10.0  14.0  11.7  12.1  14.0  8.1 
1969  7.3  9.5  13.3  10.2  11.1  11.6  6.4 
1970  6.4  8.9  12.1  8.1  9.7  9.1  5.3 
1971  6.3  8.9  12.3  8.4  9.9  9.6  5.7 
1972  6.7  9.1  12.9  9.2  10.4  9.9  5.6 
1973  8.7  10.5  15.1  8.6  9.9  10.5  5.4 
1974  9.0  10.7  16.7  6.4  8.4  ...  ... 
1975  5.4  8.2  12.9  6.9  8.9  ... 
1976  5.9  8.5  12.9  7.9  9.7  ... 
1977  6.0  8.6  13.1  ... 
Sources:  Brainard-Shoven-Weiss-Calculations  by  the  authors  based  on  a  sample  of  187  firms  selected 
from  the  Compustat  tape  containing  income  and  balance  sheet  data.  The  firms  selected  were  ones  that 
did  not  merge  and  ones  for  which  data  were  available  for  the  entire  period;  Feldstein-Summers-Martini 
Feldstein  and  Lawrence  Summers,  "Is  the  Rate  of  Profit  Falling?"  BPEA,  1:1977,  table  1, p.  216;  Nord- 
haus-William  D.  Nordhaus,  "The  Falling  Share  of  Profits,"  BPEA,  1:1974,  table  5,  p.  180. 
a.  The  net and  gross  rates after  corporate  income  tax are rN  and  rG,  respectively;  the corresponding  rates 
before  corporate  income  tax  are  RN and  RG. 
187 firms are those in the Compustat file that did not merge and that pro- 
vided all the data required by our computation procedure for the entire 
twenty-year period. This procedure may introduce a number of sample 
biases. Perhaps the most important is that those firms that have survived 
to the present have experienced actual earnings that, on average, exceeded 
investors' expectations early in the sample period. The exclusion of firms 
that merged is another factor that makes our sample unrepresentative of 
all firms, although the direction of the bias is less clear. We do not, how- 
ever, explicitly evaluate these sample biases. 
Table 1 displays net and gross rates of return to capital for an aggre- 
gate of the 187 firms  in our sample and compares these figures with similar 464  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1980 
computations made by William Nordhaus and by Martin Feldstein and 
Lawrence Summers. The different series of the table are not strictly com- 
parable because of different samples and definitions of return. The Feld- 
stein-Summers figures are before corporate income tax and are derived 
from data on the revised national income  accounts. The  Nordhaus  r, 
series is also based on the national income accounts but is after tax. Our 
series show the smallest bulge for the mid-i 960s and the smallest decline 
in the 1970s. These differences indicate that our sample is not represen- 
tative of the entire nonfinancial sector. We compared the magnitude of our 
inflation adjustments (inventory valuation adjustment and capital con- 
sumption adjustment) with those in the national income accounts, and the 
magnitudes are approximately consistent. Presumably, therefore, the dif- 
ferences reflect variations in reported earnings rather than in our adjust- 
ments to them. 
The paradox that we explore in this paper is the fall of  the market 
valuation of our sample of 187 firms despite the relative constancy of the 
calculated productivity of their capital stocks. If the rates of return for 
our sample were misestimated and in fact changed more like those esti- 
mated by Feldstein and Summers for the aggregate economy, there would 
be less of a puzzle, and this would have the effect of raising the implicit 
required rate of discount during the 1  960s  and lowering it in the 1  970s. 
CALCULATING  MARKET  VALUATION 
We seek to determine the market valuation of claims to returns ema- 
nating from physical capital. The ownership claims to this flow fall into five 
broad groups: common stock, preferred  stock, bank and bond debt, short- 
term liabilities not included in bank and bond debt (principally accounts 
payable),  and other claims (unfunded pension liabilities). 
The value of common stock is taken as the year-end values from the 
Compustat data. Because of  the difficulty in obtaining actual preferred 
stock prices, we calculate a firm's aggregate preferred market value by 
dividing its total reported preferred  dividends by Moody's preferred stock 
yield index. 
The market value of debt is more difficult to estimate. Available data 
decompose book-value  debt, bt, into short-term debt, STDt  (maturing 
within one year) and all other long-term debt (LTDt): 
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The market value of short-term debt is assumed to equal book value. 
To estimate the market value of long-term debt, the following assump- 
tions were made:  new bonds are issued at par and have a maturity of 
twenty years; bonds have identical default characteristics represented by 
a Baa rating; the maturity distribution of bonds for each firm in the first 
year of study, 1958, is proportional to the maturity distribution of aggre- 
gate outstanding issues; and no new debt is issued unless total long-term 
debt in t is greater than long-term debt in t -  1  minus estimated matured 
issuances of debt. Under these conditions, new debt issued in period t, Nt, 
for t >  195 8 is calculated by 
Nt =  LTDt -  LTDt-,  +  Nt-19  if LTDt >  LTDt,  -Nt-19. 
If  LTDt <  LTDt,  -  Nt19, then Nt =  0 
and  N  LTDt  Nt  1 
LTt,-  Nt,.19- 
that is, early retirements are proportional to existing issuances of debt. 
Given the  derived maturities and associated coupon  rates, the current 
dollar values of these debts may be computed easily. As might be expected 
in a period of accelerating inflation and rising interest rates, most bonds 
have sold at a discount from book values during 1958-77. 
The sum of common and preferred stock and debt at market value is 
usually taken to be the market value of a firm. However, we are interested 
only in the market value of the underlying real stock of capital. Thus we 
subtract net short-term assets from this sum. This procedure is valid only 
if these assets can be converted readily into cash and if their market value 
equals stated book  value. This does not appear to be too far from the 
truth, given the types of claims that assets include. No  attempt is made 
to estimate the effects of unfunded pension liabilities or other contingent 
claims that may subordinate equity claims. This is perhaps a more serious 
omission. 
CALCULATING  q 
Following the early work of William Brainard and James Tobin, we 
constructed estimates of the ratio of market value to replacement cost, q, 
for the aggregate of the 187 firms in each year.8 For comparison, we pre- 
8.  William  C. Brainard and James Tobin,  "Pitfalls  in Financial  Model  Building," 
Amer-icant  Econiomnic  Reviev,  vol.  58  (May  1968,  Papers  anid Proceedinigs,  1967), 
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Table 2.  Alternative Estimates of the Aggregate Ratio of Market Value to 
Replacement Cost, q, 1958-77 
Econiomic 
Braiiiard,  Report 
Shove)l,  of the  Tobiln-  Liiidlen1berg-  Vo0) 
Year  Weiss  Presidelit  Brclinacrd  Ross  Ciccolo  Futrsteliberg 
1958  1.49  0.87  ...  ...  1.11  0.73 
1959  1.55  1.04  ...  ...  1.30  0.85 
1960  1.42  1.02  2.21  1.71  1.24  0.83 
1961  1.66  1.15  2.51  2.00  1.66  0.92 
1962  1.39  1.09  1.88  1.60  1.43  0.87 
1963  1.55  1.20  2.21  1.72  1.72  0.97 
1964  1.70  1.30  2.29  1.79  1.90  1.04 
1965  1.74  1.36  2.50  1.96  2.05  1.09 
1966  1.39  1.21  2.11  1.62  1.41  0.98 
1967  1.58  1.22  2.51  1.82  1.61  0.98 
1968  1.56  1.26  2.54  1.84  1.76  0.99 
1969  1.30  1.12  2.12  1.61  1.37  0.88 
1970  1.20  0.91  1.92  1.48  1.08  0.71 
1971  1.26  1.00  2.00  1.58  1.28  0.78 
1972  1.37  1.08  1.99  1.63  1.56  0.85 
1973  1.07  1.02  1.43  1.28  1.25  0.82 
1974  0.69  0.76  0.97  0.96  0.70  0.68 
1975  0.74  0.73  ...  1.00  0.79  0.61 
1976  0.83  0.83  ...  0.98  0.97  0.68 
1977  0.72  0.77  ...  0.88  0.84 
Sources:  Brainard-Shoven-Weiss-CalcuLlations  by  the  author-s  based  oni a  sam-iple of  187 fir-miis  selected 
from  the  Comipustat  data  tape;  Economic  Report  of  the  President-JanlUary  1979  volulmie,  table  30,  p. 
128; Tobini-Brainard-James  Tobin  and  Williami  C.  Brainard,  "Asset  Markets  and  the  Cost  of  Capital,"  ill 
Bela  Balassa  and  Richard  Nelson,  eds.,  Econiomizic  Progress,  Prii'ate  Values  aznd Public  Policy,  Essa vs  in 
Honior  of  IVillianii Felhier  (North-Holland,  1977),  p.  254;  Lindenberg-Ross-Eric  B.  Lindenberg  and 
Stephen  A.  Ross,  "Tobin's  Q  Rates  and  Inidustrial  Organization,"  Journial  of  Businiess  (forthcomiiing): 
Ciccolo-John  H.  Ciccolo,  "Tobin's  q  and  Tax  Incentives,"  paper  prepar-ed  for  the  1979  Southern  Fi- 
nancial  Associationi  Meetinig;  and  von  Furstenberg-George  M.  von  Furstenberg,  "Corporate  Iiivest- 
ment:  Does  Market  ValuLation Matter  in  the  Aggregate?"  BPEA,  2:1977,  pp.  351-55. 
sent similar estimates in table 2 by Tobin and Brainard, Eric Lindenberg 
and Stephen Ross, John Ciccolo, George von Furstenberg, and one from 
the Economic Report of the President, January 1979. The Tobin-Brainard 
and Lindenberg-Ross studies both use the data on firms from the Compu- 
stat data base whereas the other studies use aggregate data. The various 
estimates show significantly different levels-which  are difficult to recon- 
cile-but  nevertheless show similar patterns through time. W. Brainard, J. Shoven, and L. Weiss  467 
FORECASTING  FUTURE  EARNINGS 
To  calculate the two intrinsic values described above-cash-out  and 
constant-capital cases-we  seek to determine, for each firm in each year, 
the present value  of  discounted future gross cash flows.  This  requires 
both an estimate of these uncertain, multiperiod cash flows and a method 
of valuation. 
For these calculations we assume that the firm will operate all existing 
capital until the end of its lifetime, when it will be discarded without scrap 
value. In the constant-capital case each unit of capital is replaced, whereas 
for the cash-out case, it is not. Each unit of capital operating at a particu- 
lar time receives the same return. As noted earlier, we estimate the pro- 
ductive lifetimes of capital (separately for plant, and equipment plus land, 
when possible)  from the Security Exchange Commission  10-K reports 
for 1975. From our estimate of the composition and age structure of the 
capital stock for each firm and each year we derive an estimate of the 
fraction of the original capital existing at time t that will be operational 
periods later (D,+7). 
Some physical assets, inventories, and other assets (including invest- 
ments in stock, unconsolidated subsidiaries, long-term receivables) do not 
depreciate or become  obsolete.  In the cash-out calculation these assets 
are taken to be liquidated at inflation-corrected book value so that they 
remain the same fraction of  total assets as they were in the base year. 
That is, in each year T- a fraction Dt+?  -  Dt+??1  of these assets is sold. 
Thus in the cash-out case the returns 7  years in the future associated 
with a firm with capital stock (including inventories and other assets), Kt, 
at time t are given by: 
RATK,D,+T ?  (inventories and  (D 
other assetst  / 
where RtA+T  is the random rate of return for the firm  7  periods hence, gross 
of depreciation, net of corporate tax. The future returns for the constant- 
capital case correspond to this equation with all D set at unity. The esti- 
mates of R  A ,  are constructed by separately estimating before-tax rates 
of return and future effective taxes. The before-tax rates are assumed to 
be generated by stationary real processes, whereas the nonneutral effect 
of inflation on the real value of depreciation and interest is taken into 
account when calculating the taxes. 468  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1980 
Several different methods of  the expected before-tax future rates of 
return, Rt, are constructed. Each corresponds to a different way investors 
might model  the process  generating rates of  return. All  these  models 
depict stationary processes,  so  that past outcomes  provide a guide to 
future values.  In  the first three models  the expected future before-tax 
gross return depends only on past returns; the market valuation or other 
firm characteristics  are not used in the forecast. The models are as follows. 
(1 )  A pure  random walk-the  expected rate of return in each future 
period is the current realization. If this is what investors assume, no other 
information should improve the implied estimates of market values. 
(2)  A first-order autoregressive process-the  rate of return for each 
firm is governed by 
Rt=  a +  XRt-, +  Zt 
Estimates for a  and X were obtained from regression equations for the 
entire time series and were used to construct an estimate of the return T 
periods in the future: 
E(R ?+T)  -  (1 -  At) a  +  xTR 
(3)  Perfect foresight-the  expected rate of return held by market par- 
ticipants is assumed to be the actual outcome for all realizations for which 
data are available, that is, before 1977. The estimates after 1977 are from 
(2)  above. 
The next three models decompose the gross rate of return  for each firm 
into two component parts. One component, ,P,R,t,  is perfectly correlated 
with the aggregate gross rate of return, R,..t, as estimated by Feldstein and 
Summers and reproduced here in the fourth column of table 1.9 The other 
component, r?, is independent of the aggregate rate. These  procedures 
therefore require estimates of the relation of the firm's return to the aggre- 
gate, and predictions of both rt and R,,,t. The following equation was esti- 
mated for each of 187 firms using the entire sample period: 
Rjt =  oj +  - jR-  +  jt  =  ?  r,t +  /jR??It. 
To determine the extent to which our results are sensitive to the assumption 
that the relation between a firm's gross rate of return and the aggregate 
9.  Martin  Feldstein  and  Lawrence  Summers,  "Is  the  Rate  of  Profit  Falling?" 
BPEA,  1:1977,  table  1, p. 216. W. Brainard, J. Shoven, and L. Weiss  469 
return is constant, the equation is also estimated separately on the two 
halves of the sample period. In general, the ,B  coefficients differ substan- 
tially in the two subperiods. 
The three procedures that separate the return each assume that r?,  fol- 
lows a random walk but make different assumptions about the process 
generating R. t. We therefore know that 
E(Rjt+,)  =  sjt +  /E(Rmtt?+)- 
The methods are as follows. 
(4)  Random walk for rt,  autoregressive process for  R,,,t-a  regres- 
sion equation was estimated, 
Rmnt  =  0.019 +  0.83 Rmt_I  +  Em,t 
R2  =  0.68;  standard  error  =  0.0082;  Durbin-Watson  =  1.33. 
Thus 
E(R m  t+?r) =  I  -  (0.83),  0 019 +  (0.83)  RrntR 
I-(0.83) 
(5)  Random walk for rt,  perfect foresight R,,t-for  the period outside 
the sample, model 4 was used for R,,,t. 
(6)  Random walk for rt,  R,, tdistributed  independently and identically 
over time-E(R,t)  =  0.1083,  the overall sample mean for  1958-77. 
The above three models actually formed six cases because they are im- 
plemented once using the ,B  estimates determined from the entire sample, 
and a second time using separate f  estimates for each half of the period. 
(7)  The final procedure uses information generally available to inves- 
tors to predict future gross flows. Regressions are estimated on the pooled 
time-series observations to  predict rates of  return one,  three, and five 
years in the future. The  predictions for years two  and four are linear 
interpolations of one and three, and three and five, respectively. Predic- 
tion of returns for five years are used for each year past the fifth year. 
Thus the typical regression equation is 
R  =  ao +  a 1 Rt +  a2  RDIVt  +  at3  CDIVt  +  at4  RINVt 
+  6t5  aqt  +  66  Cqt  +  6a7 Cst  +  6a8 RDEPt  +  Ect+, 
where 
Rt =  gross rate of return in year t 
RDIVt =  dividends divided by before-tax gross cash flow c~0 
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CDIV,  =  percentage  change  in nominal  dividends  from  t  -  1 to  t 
RINV, =  gross investment divided by net capital 
qt =  market value divided by replacement cost of capital 
Cq,  =  percentage  change  in q from  t-  1 to  t 
CS,  =  percentage  change  in real sales  from  t  -  1 to  t 
RDEPt =  real depreciation divided by before-tax gross cash flow 
Dividend payments and changes in dividends are regarded as conveying 
information about permanent earnings. Similarly, investment provides 
information about management's view of future profitability. A firm's q 
and change in q provide an investor with the market's assessment of the 
future earnings potential of a firm. A high q, for example, can indicate the 
existence  of  profit opportunities that have not yet appeared in current 
earnings or sales. Real depreciation may be important in predicting the 
gross rate of return because in equilibrium firms with high rates of depre- 
ciation will have high gross rates. 
The results from estimating regressions on the gross rate for the entire 
sample period are reported in table 3. The average data for the rate-of- 
return regression equations are shown in table 4. The three equations look 
surprisingly sensible. The current rate of return is of great, but declining, 
significance in forecasting future rates. Dividends are also significant, and 
their importance in prediction increases the further the forecast is into 
the future. The negative coefficient on CDIV  seems consistent with the 
view that dividends are increased when the value of retention is low. In 
the short run, investment appears to affect the rate of return negatively, 
possibly reflecting the fact that it increases the capital stock before raising 
revenues. Investment does seem to be positively related to returns after 
three years, but only weakly related to earnings further into the future. 
The  level  of  q does  indeed  seem  to  provide information about future 
earnings. One  plausible  interpretation of  the  negative  coefficient  for 
change in real sales is that changes in sales only give rise to transitory 
earnings. 
DISCOUNTING  FUTURE  EARNINGS 
Computations of intrinsic values require not only a projection of uncer- 
tain future gross cash flows, but a method of valuing them. We compute 
the intrinsic values implied by discounting the expected future returns by 
three different discount rates: an inflation-adjusted bond rate, zero per- 472  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1980 
Table 4.  Average Values of the Variables in Rate of Return Regressions, Model 7, 
1958-77 
Percent, except as noted 
In7depen7den7t  variable 
Year  Rt  RDIV  CDIV  RINV  q (ratio)  Cq  CS  RDEP 
1958  15.8  19.5  0.0  8.7  1.59  ...  ...  34.6 
1959  17.3  17.6  13.2  8.8  1.80  9.1  12.0  29.8 
1960  16.0  19.3  7.7  9.6  1.74  -0.7  3.7  32.3 
1961  15.6  19.3  4.7  8.1  1.99  15.5  3.5  31.9 
1962  16.1  18.8  7.0  8.4  1.51  -22.9  7.9  31.2 
1963  16.3  18.0  6.5  8.7  1.59  7.2  6.4  29.5 
1964  17.2  17.3  10.5  9.2  1.71  8.5  9.9  27.4 
1965  18.1  16.8  13.4  10.5  1.90  9.5  10.8  25.8 
1966  17.6  17.1  12.9  11.8  1.51  -23.2  9.3  26.0 
1967  16.2  18.4  9.5  10.7  1.83  16.6  5.1  29.1 
1968  16.7  17.0  6.8  9.7  1.85  5.1  8.1  28.2 
1969  16.2  16.3  5.7  10.1  1.56  -23.5  6.6  29.2 
1970  14.1  17.2  2.2  9.3  1.37  -10.4  0.5  34.0 
1971  13.8  16.0  -0.1  8.4  1.50  6.4  2.4  35.1 
1972  14.5  13.9  2.8  7.9  1.59  0.8  8.0  32.7 
1973  16.4  11.7  11.0  8.9  1.16  -29.8  11.1  27.7 
1974  16.3  11.4  12.8  9.4  0.75  -35.6  11.1  28.0 
1975  13.0  13.5  5.5  8.0  0.82  9.8  -5.1  38.1 
1976  13.9  12.4  12.7  7.9  0.90  13.0  7.0  35.3 
1977  14.1  13.0  16.2  8.4  0.78  -11.0  6.3  35.2 
Soulrce:  Saiime as  table  3. 
cent real rate, and 4 percent real rate. We also calculate the internal rate of 
return-the  discount rate that equates the discounted value of cash pay- 
outs with the market value for the aggregate of our sample. These calcula- 
tions were made without adjustment for risk, and would be appropriate  in 
a risk-neutral world. In the next section we return to a discussion of risk 
and our treatment of risk premiums. 
The  term structure of  real discount rates corresponding to the first 
measure is constructed as follows:  first, from available data on yield to 
maturity of government bonds, an estimate is made of the term structure 
of the discount rates appropriate for discounting dollar returns arriving 
at specified dates in the future. The expected inflation rate generated by a 
weighted moving average of past inflation is subtracted from the discount 
rates. The weights for this calculation are  .  1/3, and  /.  Table 5 presents W. Braiinard  J. Shoven.  and L.  Weiss  473 
Table 5.  Inflation Projections and Term Structures of Discount Rates,  1958-77 
Percent 
Projected  Nominal discow7tt  ratea 
percenitage 
chanlEge  ini  Onte  Two  Five  Tent  Twventy 
Year-  GNP deflitorb  yeacr  yeacrs  years  yeatrs  yeacrs 
1958  2.77  2.09  2.36  2.99  3.34  3.50 
1959  2.32  4.11  4.18  4.30  4.12  4.04 
1960  2.02  3.55  3.70  4.00  4.01  4.02 
1961  1.62  2.91  3.14  3.66  3.86  3.95 
1962  1.44  3.02  3.21  3.64  3.89  4.00 
1963  1.50  3.28  3.43  3.77  3.96  4.04 
1964  1.54  3.76  3.86  4.08  4.14  4.17 
1965  1.73  4.09  4.13  4.22  4.21  4.21 
1966  2.26  5.17  5.17  5.09  4.73  4.59 
1967  2.79  4.84  4.92  5.05  4.89  4.82 
1968  3.36  5.62  5.61  5.54  5.30  5.19 
1969  4.14  7.06  6.99  6.73  6.18  5.95 
1970  4.81  6.90  7.06  7.28  6.68  6.43 
1971  5.14  4.75  5.10  5.81  5.76  5.75 
1972  4.91  4.86  5.20  5.86  5.68  5.60 
1973  4.90  7.30  7.17  6.82  6.36  6.16 
1974  6.32  8.25  8.10  7.67  7.06  6.79 
1975  8.24  6.70  6.99  7.51  7.05  6.86 
1976  8.15  5.94  6.28  6.96  6.82  6.76 
1977  6.81  6.15  6.39  6.91  7.06  7.13 
SouLrces: GNP  deflator  calculations  based  on  data  froiim Econiomiiic  Repor t of  the Presidenzt, 1980, table  B-3, 
p.  206;  calculations  of  discount  rates  based  on  data  fromii the  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve 
Systemii. 
a.  The  rate  for  discouLnting a  dollar  am-iount to  be  delivered  at  a  specified  future  date.  Comiiputed from 
the  yields  on  U.S.  governmiiient bonds. 
b.  CalcuLlated as  a  imioving average  of  past  inflation,  with  weights  of  onie-half,  one-third,  anid  one-sixth. 
the implied estimates of expected future inflation and nominal discount 
rates. 
For each of the ten cash-flow projection models, the intrinsic value of 
each firm in each year is computed using the  three different discount 
measures. Aggregating over the 187 firms in each year yields estimates of 
aggregate intrinsic value. Aggregate Z is the ratio of  aggregate market 
value to  aggregate intrinsic value. The values of Z for each projection 
model in each year are presented in table 6. 
The dramatic decline in the financial market's valuation of firms rela- 
tive to underlying cash flows is evident for all three discount measures. 
For the calculations using inflation-adjusted government bond rates, the 474  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1980 
Table 6.  Ratio of Aggregate Market Value to Intrinsic Value, for All Firms, with 
Three Different Discount Rates and for Ten Cash-Out Projection Models,  1958-77a 
Model 
Year  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Iniflationi-adjiusted  governimenit  bonid  rate 
1958  0.80  0.79  0.80  0.79  0.82  0.80  0.73  0.78  0.78  0.78 
1959  0.92  0.90  0.88  0.88  0.90  0.88  0.83  0.88  0.89  0.88 
1960  0.85  0.84  0.85  0.85  0.86  0.85  0.80  0.84  0.84  0.84 
1961  1.01  1.00  1.02  1.02  1.03  1.02  0.93  1.02  1.01  1.02 
1962  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.85  0.85  0.85  0.80  0.85  0.85  0.86 
1963  0.94  0.93  0.92  0.92  0.93  0.92  0.87  0.93  0.94  0.94 
1964  1.03  1.01  0.98  0.99  1.00  0.99  0.95  1.00  1.03  1.02 
1965  1.05  1.02  0.96  0.97  0.99  0.97  0.95  0.98  1.02  1.00 
1966  0.85  0.82  0.78  0.80  0.81  0.80  0.79  0.80  0.84  0.82 
1967  0.93  0.91  0.92  0.93  0.93  0.94  0.88  0.94  0.95  0.95 
1968  0.92  0.89  0.87  0.89  0.90  0.89  0.85  0.86  0.86  0.86 
1969  0.78  0.77  0.78  0.78  0.78  0.78  0.75  0.77  0.76  0.77 
1970  0.71  0.71  0.77  0.76  0.74  0.75  0.70  0.78  0.74  0.78 
1971  0.66  0.66  0.72  0.70  0.69  0.70  0.65  0.72  0.68  0.72 
1972  0.73  0.73  0.76  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.71  0.76  0.74  0.76 
1973  0.61  0.59  0.57  0.56  0.59  0.56  0.58  0.57  0.59  0.57 
1974  0.38  0.36  0.33  0.32  0.35  0.31  0.36  0.33  0.35  0.33 
1975  0.34  0.34  0.37  0.35  0.34  0.34  0.34  0.36  0.34  0.36 
1976  0.38  0.38  0.40  0.39  0.44  0.39  0.38  0.40  0.44  0.39 
1977  0.38  0.38  0.41  0.39  0.38  0.39  0.38  0.40  0.38  0.40 
Zero percetit real discountit  rate 
1958  0.75  0.74  0.75  0.74  0.77  0.75  0.69  0.73  0.73  0.73 
1959  0.78  0.76  0.73  0.73  0.75  0.73  0.69  0.73  0.74  0.74 
1960  0.71  0.69  0.69  0.69  0.71  0.69  0.65  0.69  0.69  0.69 
1961  0.82  0.81  0.82  0.82  0.83  0.82  0.74  0.82  0.81  0.82 
1962  0.67  0.66  0.66  0.67  0.67  0.67  0.62  0.67  0.67  0.67 
1963  0.74  0.73  0.72  0.72  0.73  0.72  0.68  0.73  0.74  0.74 
1964  0.81  0.79  0.76  0.77  0.79  0.77  0.73  0.78  0.80  0.79 
1965  0.83  0.80  0.75  0.76  0.78  0.77  0.74  0.77  0.80  0.78 
1966  0.67  0.65  0.61  0.63  0.64  0.63  0.62  0.63  0.66  0.64 
1967  0.76  0.74  0.75  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.71  0.76  0.77  0.77 
1968  0.76  0.74  0.72  0.73  0.74  0.74  0.70  0.72  0.71  0.71 
1969  0.64  0.63  0.64  0.64  0.64  0.64  0.61  0.64  0.63  0.63 
1970  0.59  0.59  0.64  0.63  0.61  0.63  0.58  0.65  0.61  0.65 
1971  0.62  0.62  0.68  0.66  0.64  0.66  0.61  0.68  0.64  0.68 
1972  0.68  0.67  0.71  0.70  0.69  0.70  0.66  0.71  0.68  0.71 
1973  0.53  0.51  0.49  0.48  0.51  0.48  0.50  0.49  0.51  0.49 W. Brainard, J. Shoven, and L. Weiss  475 
Table 6 (continued) 
Model 
Year  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
1974  0.36  0.34  0.31  0.30  0.33  0.29  0.33  0.30  0.33  0.30 
1975  0.40  0.39  0.42  0.40  0.39  0.40  0.40  0.41  0.39  0.41 
1976  0.44  0.44  0.47  0.45  0.51  0.45  0.44  0.46  0.51  0.46 
1977  0.37  0.37  0.40  0.38  0.37  0.38  0.37  0.39  0.37  0.39 
Four percenit real discounl  t rate 
1958  1.07  1.06  1.09  1.09  1.11  1.09  1.00  1.07  1.05  1.06 
1959  1.11  1.08  1.06  1.06  1.08  1.06  1.01  1.07  1.07  1.07 
1960  1.01  1.00  1.01  1.01  1.02  1.01  0.95  1.00  1.00  1.00 
1961  1.17  1.16  1.19  1.19  1.20  1.19  1.09  1.19  1.17  1.18 
1962  0.95  0.95  0.96  0.96  0.97  0.96  0.91  0.97  0.97  0.98 
1963  1.06  1.05  1.04  1.05  1.06  1.05  0.99  1.06  1.06  1.07 
1964  1.16  1.14  1.11  1.12  1.13  1.12  1.07  1.13  1.15  1.15 
1965  1.19  1.16  1.09  1.10  1.12  1.11  1.08  1.12  1.16  1.14 
1966  0.96  0.93  0.89  0.91  0.92  0.91  0.90  0.92  0.95  0.94 
1967  1.09  1.07  1.08  1.10  1.10  1.10  1.04  1.10  1.12  1.12 
1968  1.09  1.06  1.04  1.06  1.07  1.06  1.01  1.03  1.02  1.02 
1969  0.92  0.91  0.92  0.92  0.93  0.92  0.89  0.92  0.90  0.92 
1970  0.85  0.86  0.93  0.91  0.89  0.91  0.84  0.94  0.89  0.94 
1971  0.89  0.90  0.97  0.95  0.93  0.95  0.88  0.98  0.93  0.98 
1972  0.97  0.97  1.02  1.01  1.00  1.01  0.95  1.02  0.99  1.02 
1973  0.77  0.74  0.71  0.70  0.74  0.70  0.73  0.71  0.73  0.71 
1974  0.52  0.48  0.44  0.43  0.47  0.42  0.48  0.44  0.47  0.44 
1975  0.57  0.56  0.60  0.58  0.56  0.57  0.57  0.59  0.56  0.59 
1976  0.64  0.63  0.67  0.65  0.76  0.64  0.64  0.66  0.76  0.66 
1977  0.54  0.54  0.57  0.55  0.54  0.55  0.54  0.56  0.54  0.56 
Source:  Calculations  by  the  authors,  as  descr-ibed  in  the  text. 
a.  The  cash-ouLt case  assumlles that  the  value  of  a  fir-m--  r-eflects only  the  retulrns on  existing  capital.  The 
earnings  projection  miodels  are  I-pei  fect  foi-esight;  2-fir-st  order  autoregressive;  3-r  anidom-ix  walk; 
4-Pt  random  walk,  R,?,  first-order  autor-egr-essive, full  samnple 0;  5-nt  raindom--  walk,  R,,  perfect  foi-esight, 
full  samiple 0;  6-Pt  r-anidom walk,  R,,  =  R,  full  sam--ple  0;  7-RK  regressioni;  8-samne  as  miiodel 4,  split 
0;  9-sam--e  as  imiodel 5,  split  0;  and  10-samiie  as  model  6,  split  8. 
aggregate market value was within 15 percent of the present value of cash 
flows for the years  1961  through 1968.  However,  there is  a dramatic 
break after 1972; values averaged only approximately 40 percent of our 
calculated intrinsic values for 1974-78.  The change in the Z ratios through 
time is far greater than it is among the models; each of our ten methods 
of projecting rates of return yield similar present discounted values and 
Z. Qualitatively, the results are similar for the other discount rates. C  ON  S00  ON  "I'  t-  0  _  .C)  00  en  r^  N  i  J  OG  e  r 
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Tables 7 and 8 illustrate much the same story from slightly different 
perspectives. The first of these contains the real internal rates of return 
necessary in order to discount aggregate cash flows to aggregate market 
value. While these internal rates ranged roughly from 2 to 6 percent for 
the 1960s,  they vary between 7 and 19 percent for  1974-77.  This dra- 
matic increase in internal rate is independent of which rate-of-return pro- 
jection method is chosen. 
Comparison of the internal rate of return  for the cash-out and constant- 
capital assumptions is also informative. The relevant comparison is be- 
tween model  4  and the  constant-capital case,  which  assume the same 
earnings projection.  Through  1969  the internal rate for  the  constant- 
capital case is always above the internal rate for the cash-out case. That 
is, the present value of the typical firm is higher if it remains in business 
and replaces capital as it wears out. From  1973  on, the internal rate is 
higher for the cash-out case-according  to our calculations new invest- 
ment is on average unprofitable at the discount rate implied in the valua- 
tion of existing capital. 
Table 8 presents the distribution of firms by their Z values in the cash- 
out case, where forecasts of rates of return are based on model 4  and 
the inflation-adjusted government bond rate is used for discounting. The 
table shows that there was a tremendous reduction and compression of 
the distribution in the 1970s with only a single firm having a market valua- 
tion more than 125 percent of intrinsic value between 1975 and 1977. In 
contrast, in  1965  over  15 percent of our 187 firms showed Z in excess 
of 1.25. 
The behavior of the aggregate Z and the internal rate of return in the 
1970s clearly indicates that real discount rates computed as nominal rates 
minus expected inflation, no matter how estimated, will be unsuccessful 
in explaining firms' market values as the present discounted value of the 
future earnings we project. Indeed, the aggregate internal rate-of-return 
series more closely resembles an unadjusted nominal rate than anyone's 
estimate of the real rate. One possibility is severe inflation illusion in the 
discounting of real corporate cash flows; equivalently, the market may not 
believe that real before-tax corporate cash flows will be maintained with 
continued inflation. Another hypothesis is that the return to capital has 
become riskier and that the market price of  risk has risen. In the next 
section we discuss the measurement of risk and the use of cross-sectional 
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MEASUREMENT  AND  VALUATION  OF  RISK 
The determination of the value of a risky stream of payments can be 
decomposed into two steps: time discounting to determine the present dol- 
lar equivalent of future (certain)  dollar amounts, and risk discounting to 
determine the certainty equivalent payout for each future period. We rely 
on the measures of risk suggested by the familiar Sharpe-Lintner-Black 
capital-asset pricing model (CAPM).10 This model draws a sharp distinc- 
tion between diversifiable and systematic risk. Based on the assumption 
that investors seek to hold mean-variance efficient portfolios, the theory 
implies that risks which will disappear in well-diversified portfolios  (di- 
versifiable risks) will not require a premium over the risk-free rate. 
The systematic risk of an asset measures its contribution to the riski- 
ness of the investor's entire portfolio and therefore requires a risk pre- 
mium. This contribution reflects the covariance of the asset's return with 
the return on the investor's entire portfolio. According to the CAPM, this 
covariance is the same as the covariance with the "market  portfolio." This 
reflects the fact that in the presence of a riskless asset, each investor holds 
risky assets in proportion to their importance in the overall market. More 
precisely, the model characterizes the condition for market equilibrium 
by the risk-return  equation: 
(1)  E(Rit) =  Rf  t +  dli(E(RL,)  -Rf  t), 
where 
E(Rit) =  expected return on any security or portfolio i from t -  1  to t 
fi  =  coV (Rit,  R.nt)  /O.2(Rmt) 
Rf,  =  risk-free rate from t -  1 to t 
E(Rmt)  =  expected return on the market portfolio. 
The P  in these equations are the same coefficients that govern rate-of- 
return  forecasts in models 4, 5, and 6. 
10.  The  CAPM  was  developed  by  William  Sharpe  and  John  Lintner  and  later 
extended  by Fisher  Black.  See  William  F.  Sharpe,  "Capital  Asset  Prices:  A  Theory 
of  Market Equilibrium  under  Conditions  of  Risk,"  The Journal  of  Finianice, vol.  19 
(September  1964),  pp. 425-42;  John Lintner,  "The Valuation  of  Risk Assets  and the 
Selection  of  Risky  Investments  in Stock  Portfolios  and Capital  Budgets,"  Review  of 
Econiomics  anid Statistics,  vol.  47  (February  1965),  pp.  13-37;  and  Fisher  Black, 
"Capital  Market  Equilibrium  with  Restricted  Borrowing,"  Jouriial  of  Business,  vol. 
45 (July  1972),  pp. 444-54. 480  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1980 
One difficulty in implementing the CAPM is identifying the market 
portfolio that appears in equation 1. We assume that the relevant port- 
folio is the nonfinancial corporate capital stock and that the market return 
is the return  on that stock. Hence the risk measures are fundamental; they 
are related to the firm's cash flows, including interest, rather than to the 
investors' yield (dividends plus capital gains)  that is usually the focus of 
studies of the stock market. A second difficulty  in implementing the theory 
is extending it to value assets whose returns are distributed over future 
periods. The approach we use is a variation of the model proposed by 
Douglas Breeden.1I 
As  in the CAPM,  it is assumed that individuals maximize expected 
utility, and that utility can be expressed as 
co 
w=  ~  d(j, t)U(C1), 
j=t 
where d(j,  t)  is the subjective time discount factor for i to t. For a se- 
curity of value, Vi, yielding a stream of uncertain cash payouts, Dit,  an 
optimizing investor's first-order conditions for a maximum are 
(2)  U'(Ct)Vit  =  E(  2  d(j, t)U'(Cj)Dij), 
where Cj is consumption at time j. 
If the function U is quadratic, or if continuous time trading is permitted, 
equation 2 may be expressed as 
(3)  Vit =  E  E(Dij) -  y cov (Di,  Cj)loci 
where R  jt is the risk-free rate for i period loans at time t; y is the constant 
price of risk; and of is the standard deviation of consumption in period j. 
To implement the theory, each individual's consumption in period j, Cj 
is taken to be proportional to the aggregate rate of return series, R,,,t. This 
is justifiable only if capital holders have no other income sources and if 
a constant fraction of aggregate income is reinvested. 
The rate-of-return models described above contain two models for the 
stochastic behavior of the market rate of return: first-order autoregres- 
11.  Douglas  T. Breeden,  "An Intertemporal  Asset  Pricing  Model  with  Stochastic 
Consumption  and Investment  Opportunities,"  Journial of  Financial  Economtiics, vol. 
7 (September  1979),  pp. 265-96. W. Brainard, J. Shoven, and L. Weiss  481 
sive and independently, identically distributed for each period. The first 
implies  that  the variance  of the market  rate  grows  as (1 -  82)  / (1  -  8 2), 
where 8 is the market autoregressive coefficient, while the second implies 
that the variance remains constant. 
If the firm's earnings are generated by model 4, the covariance of the 
cash flow of firm  j in period  t  +  T  and the market  is K1,?+T cov  (Rj,?,+T 
RM  ,,t+T),  which equals Kj,1?+T  3j(l  +  62  +  *  62(Tl))o2(E  )  Thus the risk- 
adjusted present discounted value of firm  j in period t, MVj,  is given by 
K 
,t+T 
-  2Tr  1/2 
(4)  MV,,~  =  E (cash payout),+T  co  E  +T(1  62)J 
T0=  (I  ?  Rf)T  T0  (1 +  Rf)Tr 
where Rf is the (assumed constant)  risk-free discount rate and 0 is the 
price of risk / multiplied by o(E,,,t).  For each t, 0 is taken to be constant; 
we assume agents do not expect changes in the price or quantity of risk. 
However,  they may have different expectations  at different times. The 
case in which the market is independent and identically distributed corre- 
sponds to 8 =  0. 
Dividing both sides of equation 4 by the expected value of future cash 
flows allows Z for each firm to be calculated as a function of Rf and 0: 
MVj,t  (5)  Zj, t(Rf5 0)-  co E(cash payout).+T 
-0  (1  +  Rf)r 
KIT(l  -  62T)1/2 





T0  1  +  Rf  )r 
E(cash payout),+r 
Tr=O  (1  +  Rf ) 
Assuming that the market value of a firm differs from intrinsic value by an 
error  proportional  to the expected value of future cash flows, the maximum 
likelihood estimates of Rf and 0 can be determined by finding the values 
that minimize E  (Zj,,(Rf, 0) -  1)2.  The value of Rf, which (together with 
j 
0) minimizes this expression, is called the adjusted risk-free rate and is 
reported in table 9. For comparison, the unadjusted rate that made the 
aggregate Z equal to  1 and the difference, termed the risk discount, are 482  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1980 
Table  9. Risk-Adjusted  and  Unadjusted  Internal  Rates of Return  for Model 4, 1958-77a 
Percent 
Risk  Risk 
Constant-capital case  discount  Cash-out case  discount 
(percentage  (percenttage 
Year  Uniadjusted Risk free  points)  Unadjusted  Risk free  points) 
1958  3.9  1.9  -2  2.9  -0.  1  -3 
1959  4.6  2.6  -2  3.2  -0.8  -4 
1960  4.8  3.8  -1  3.8  -0.8  -3 
1961  3.9  2.9  -1  2.0  0.0  -2 
1962  5.4  4.4  -1  4.4  3.4  -1 
1963  5.0  4.0  -1  3.4  2.4  -  1 
1964  4.7  4.7  0  2.6  0.6  -2 
1965  4.9  3.9  -1  2.8  0.8  -2 
1966  6.1  5.1  -1  5.2  3.2  -2 
1967  4.3  3.3  -1  2.8  -0.8  -2 
1968  4.6  3.6  -1  3.2  1.2  -2 
1969  5.2  3.2  -2  4.9  -0.9  -4 
1970  4.8  3.8  -1  5.0  2.0  -3 
1971  4.3  2.3  -2  4.4  1.4  -3 
1972  4.1  2.1  -2  3.7  -0.3  -4 
1973  8.2  5.2  -3  8.9  2.9  -6 
1974  15.2  10.2  -5  18.6  11.6  -7 
1975  8.8  6.8  -2  12.0  8.0  -4 
1976  7.3  6.3  -1  9.9  8.9  -1 
1977  9.3  8.3  -1  12.9  11.9  -1 
Source:  Same  as  table  6. 
a.  For  a  description  of  imiodel 4,  see  table  8, note  a.  The  risk  discount  is the difference  between  the  l isk- 
free  rate  of  return  and  the  unadjusted  one.  See  text  derivation  of  both. 
reported."2  If risk is an important factor affecting market value, the un- 
adjusted rate commingles the risk and time discounting in an inappropriate 
way. 
Variations in the risk discount seem to explain some of the variations 
in aggregate market values, and increases in the risk discount explain some 
of the decline in the market. The variations in the adjusted rates over time 
are less  than those  in the  unadjusted rates. Nevertheless,  there is  still 
much cross-sectional variation in the Z that cannot be explained by these 
time and risk discounts. The standard error of [Z -  1  -  0 x  (risk)]  for 
the constant-capital case is always greater than 0.29  (in 1977),  reaching a 
maximum of 0.56  (in 1960). 
12.  The  fact  that the  risk-discount  results  are always  integers  simply  reflects  the 
coarseness  of our maximum  likelihood  search procedure. W. Brainard, J. Shoven, and L. Weiss  483 
Analysis of Cross-sectional Variation in Market Values 
In this section we examine a variety of hypotheses about the decline 
in the market value of capital by regressing the Z of individual firms on a 
number of characteristics  of those firms. 
The variables fall into four groups. The first group contains two risk 
measures intended to examine the possibility that increasing risk is re- 
sponsible for the decline in firms' valuation. The variables in the second 
group are included to examine the effects of inflation on firms' Z. These 
may arise because of the inflation confusions such as those suggested by 
Modigliani and Cohn, or because the market anticipates different infla- 
tion rates from those  we  embedded in our intrinsic value  calculation. 
The third group of variables examines whether the market places more or 
less weight on distant earnings than our calculations, and whether there 
has been a change in the way they are weighted, reflecting a loss of con- 
fidence in the future earnings potential of firms. The fourth group con- 
tains variables that can influence valuation through factors not included 
in our procedure and can test the appropriateness of our assumptions. 
Our discussion focuses  on  the results for two  earnings projections: 
model 4, which assumes that firms' earnings depend on aggregate earn- 
ings and a firm-specific error, and model 7, which uses a variety of vari- 
ables  (see  table  3)  to  forecast  the  future  rates  of  return. In  these 
calculations the risk-unadjusted internal rates are used to calculate indi- 
vidual firms'  Z, the effect of risk being freely estimated. Tables 10 and 1  1 
show the results for  model  4  under the cash-out  and constant-capital 
assumptions, respectively, and table  12 shows the results for model  7. 
In addition to reporting the year-by-year results, we also report estimates 
for the entire sample period and for the sample split in half. Table 13 gives 
the means and standard deviations of the variables used in the regressions. 
EFFECTS  OF  DIVERSIFIABLE  AND  NONDIVERSIFIABLE  RISK 
Two measures of risk are included in the cross-sectional regressions, 
the measure of CAPM risk (RISK)  developed above and a measure of 
the variation of a firm's  rate of return that is independent of the aggregate 
(ORISK).  This latter measure is proportional to the estimated standard 
deviation of the process generating the firm-specific error. In the case of 484  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1980 




period  Meano  Z  Conzstanot  RISK  ORISK  FIVE  PINT  DI V  CDIV 
1959  0.9946  -0.7502  -2.3977  -0.2282  1.9694  0.7458  0.4834  0.0932 
(-1.94)  (-0.81)  (-1.79)  (3.14)  (0.95)  (1.19)  (0.63) 
1960  1.0352  -0.4972  -3.4054  -0.1335  1.7132  0.1503  0.3719  -0.2081 
(-1.21)  (-1.38)  (-1.15)  (2.62)  (0.23)  (0.91)  (-1.60) 
1961  1.0085  -0.4100  0.3483  -0.0606  1.1325  -0.3368  0.3893  0.2453 
(-1.20)  (0.18)  (-0.66)  (2.33)  (-0.60)  (1.19)  (1.17) 
1962  0.9501  -0.0842  -0.7445  -0.1844  0.3117  -0.1435  0.4604  0.1773 
(-0.37)  (-0.49)  (-2.56)  (0.80)  (-0.36)  (1.97)  (1.54) 
1963  0.9282  -0.2653  -0.1219  -0.1315  0.2423  0.0598  0.6401  0.1457 
(-0.92)  (-0.07)  (-1.64)  (0.56)  (0.13)  (2.17)  (0.74) 
1964  0.9100  -0.3182  0.0239  -0.2272  0.5989  0.0045  0.6485  -0.0296 
(-1.20)  (0.02)  (-2.98)  (1.61)  (0.01)  (2.17)  (-0.17) 
1965  0.9808  -0.2157  0.9072  -0.2674  0.3660  0.3400  0.2372  0.0796 
(-0.80)  (0.52)  (-3.00)  (0.91)  (0.78)  (0.76)  (0.65) 
1966  0.9724  -0.2641  -0.0069  -0.2965  -0.6981  0.2170  0.4280  0.1702 
(-0.79)  (-0.00)  (-2.59)  (-1.24)  (0.43)  (1.13)  (0.72) 
1967  0.9987  -0.7302  0.9666  -0.0200  0.0283  0.3498  -0.2246  -0.0760 
(-2.25)  (0.50)  (-0.20)  (0.05)  (0.67)  (-0.57)  (-0.  33) 
1968  1.0447  -0.5209  -2.4601  0.0130  0.0798  0.1731  0.0448  0.1721 
(-1.86)  (-1.46)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.45)  (0.13)  (0.81) 
1969  1.0139  -0.1790  -5.1359  -0.1296  -2.3357  0.3083  0.0336  0.0322 
(-0.47)  (-2.47)  (-1.27)  (-3.22)  (0.70)  (0.08)  (0.13) 
1970  0.9767  -0.3424  -5.1892  0.0759  -0.8533  0.2199  0.6796  0.1569 
(-1.02)  (-2.55)  (0.97)  (-1.30)  (0.62)  (1.82)  (1.02) 
1971  1.0304  0.1563  -1.8109  0.0838  -0.9170  -0.2399  -0.4375  0.0609 
(0.44)  (-0.99)  (1.16)  (-1.45)  (-1.56)  (-1.12)  (0.42) 
1972  0.9780  -0.0973  -3.2802  0.0032  -1.5204  -0.2998  -0.6680  0.0601 
(-0.23)  (-1.58)  (0.03)  (-1.99)  (-0.55)  (-1.31)  (0.35) 
1973  0.9543  1.1603  -9.6494  -0.3039  -2.1226  -0.6949  -0.3416  0.1307 
(1.79)  (-3.19)  (-1.82)  (-1.58)  (-1  .00)  (-0.44)  (0.72) 
1974  1.0118  2.2169  -14.0277  -0.6527  -2.6692  0.1945  1.2370  0.7122 
(2.34)  (-3.64)  (-4.19)  (-1.62)  (0.54)  (2.34)  (2.80) 
1975  0.9809  0.8340  -3.0563  -0.2306  -1.3505  0.1782  1.4477  -0.0915 
(1.56)  (-1.19)  (-2.16)  (-1.29)  (0.46)  (3.19)  (-0.62) 
1976  0.9277  0.4256  -5.9851  -0.0820  -0.5582  0.2286  1.4519  -0.0994 
(1.26)  (-3.73)  (-1.19)  (-0.85)  (0.71)  (3.60)  (-0.83) 
1977  0.9486  0.8956  -7.8127  -0.1979  -0.8583  0.7070  1.2656  -0.0787 
(2.94)  (-6.60)  (-3.29)  (-1.51)  (2.65)  (4.41)  (-0.63) 
1959-77  0.9813  ...  -1.9218  -0.0649  0.5059  0.0867  0.4775  0.0223 
(-4.43)  (-3.04)  (3.77)  (0.87)  (5.60)  (0.62) 
1959-67  0.9754  ...  0.0709  -0.1385  0.8018  0.0971  0.4387  0.0203 
(0.11)  (-4.47)  (4.91)  (0.57)  (4.04)  (0.42) 
1968-77  0.9867  ...  -3.8425  -0.0542  -0.7377  0.2034  0.4702  -0.0133 
(-6.17)  (-1.82)  (-3.06)  (1.60)  (3.47)  (-0.26) 
Source:  Estimations  by  the  authors.  The  aggregate  internal  rate  used  in  the  discounting  is from  the  column  for 
model  4 in  table  7.  For  a  description  of  this  model  see  table  8,  note  a. 
a.  The  ORISK  and  RISK  variables  represent  the  firm's  own  risk as  measured  by  the  standard  error  of  the  equa- 
tion  relating  firms'  rate  of  return  to  the  aggregate  rate  of  return  and  a  measure  of  risk  based  on  the  capital-asset 
pricing  model,  respectively;  FIVE  is defined  as 
5  GCF  /  GCFr 
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CSALES  RDEP  GRATE  CGRATE  RINV  BLOAT]  BLOAT2  BLOAT3  R2 
0.4456  -0.2579  2.7644  1.5748  2.8581  -1.5285  2.1584  0.4218  0.42 
(0.99)  (-0.37)  (3.89)  (1.61)  (2.31)  (-0.22)  (1.47)  (0.80) 
0.4365  -0.6384  3.3148  -2.8823  3.5785  -0.9616  2.2242  1.0653  0.47 
(1.15)  (-1.  10)  (4.16)  (-2.33)  (3.85)  (-0.18)  (1.72)  (2.02) 
0.2813  0.2269  4.2118  -1.5114  1.8891  -0.3312  0.2971  0.9053  0.56 
(0.72)  (0.47)  (5.61)  (-1.37)  (2.06)  (-0.02)  (0.26)  (2.16) 
0.1655  0.3708  3.7738  -1.7834  1.0125  -0.6958  0.7676  0.8307  0.61 
(0.56)  (1.06)  (7.14)  (-1.93)  (1.71)  (-0.12)  (0.79)  (2.71) 
0.4515  0.6714  3.8280  -2.4053  0.8409  -2.3209  0.4301  0.9411  0.56 
(1.60)  (1.63)  (5.99)  (-2.19)  (1.24)  (-0.70)  (0.39)  (2.62) 
0.3668  0.6300  3.6399  -2.7013  0.6927  0.2979  0.6238  0.5779  0.58 
(1.93)  (1.56)  (6.58)  (-2.63)  (1.12)  (0.13)  (0.52)  (1.67) 
0.2290  0.1959  4.0819  -1.0917  2.3689  0.4602  1.1325  1.2066  0.65 
(0.83)  (0.45)  (7.20)  (-0.99)  (4.05)  (0.49)  (0.74)  (3.04) 
0.5409  1.2801  5.0359  -2.6621  1.2372  0.9049  -0.3219  0.4315  0.55 
(1.41)  (2.47)  (6.88)  (-1.93)  (2.10)  (0.73)  (-0.16)  (0.95) 
0.6935  1.2340  6.3263  -3.6337  0.4339  1.2738  1.6973  0.5733  0.55 
(2.21)  (2.33)  (7.37)  (-2.54)  (0.58)  (1.05)  (0.76)  (1.27) 
0.6778  0.9619  5.5973  -2.0523  0.5453  0.9750  1.2415  0.7762  0.58 
(2.43)  (2.11)  (8.73)  (-1.96)  (0.85)  (1.05)  (0.65)  (1.94) 
0.8043  1.5490  8.1085  -5.1073  1.9139  0.1437  0.7984  0.9775  0.57 
(1.98)  (2.29)  (8.95)  (-2.89)  (2.00)  (0.20)  (0.30)  (1.82) 
0.7863  0.7502  5.9970  -1.9626  1.4451  0.3422  1.1786  0.5530  0.53 
(2.48)  (1.21)  (6.73)  (-1.37)  (1.43)  (0.41)  (0.53)  (1.22) 
-0.2068  0.2942  7.3933  -2.9006  1.8224  -1.0001  1.0539  1.0783  0.59 
(-0.53)  (0.45)  (7.99)  (-1.95)  (1.84)  (-1.21)  (0.48)  (2.15) 
0.0703  0.7628  8.1374  1.1911  3.9128  -0.5194  0.9571  1.2877  0.58 
(0.14)  (0.95)  (7.53)  (0.55)  (3.10)  (-0.57)  (0.37)  (1.97) 
1.1673  0.2698  5.0893  -6.1487  4.1609  -0.7121  0.3636  1.2755  0.47 
(2.04)  (0.22)  (3.55)  (-2.50)  (2.70)  (-1.13)  (0.10)  (1.30) 
-0.0442  -0.4887  2.0063  -4.6528  5.0096  0.1526  -0.2252  2.8177  0.47 
(-0.15)  (-0.48)  (1.88)  (-3.74)  (4.87)  (0.40)  (-0.07)  (2.92) 
0.3234  1.3808  3.1108  -3.6820  2.3267  -0.7337  -3.5551  1.8568  0.43 
(1.00)  (1.86)  (2.63)  ( -3.27)  (2.37)  ( -0.93)  ( -1.88)  (2.40) 
0.1217  0.8372  2.5787  1.5634  2.2638  -0.5212  -2.0981  1.1511  0.49 
(0.53)  (1.59)  (3.01)  (1.25)  (3.13)  (-1.16)  (-1.65)  (2.25) 
0.7717  0.1054  1.9083  -0.4490  1.9499  -0.6802  -0.6594  1.0933  0.53 
(2.74)  (0.26)  (2.96)  ( -0.39)  (3.09)  ( -1.92)  ( -0.69)  (2.87) 
0.3384  0.1164  3.9122  -1.8501  2.2000  -0.1563  0.5398  0.9983  0.44 
(4.52)  (0.97)  (23.32)  (-7.03)  (11.68)  (-1.05)  (1.76)  (9.27) 
0.3276  0.3359  3.8343  -1.3772  1.8495  0.9286  0.8374  0.7696  0.49 
(3.19)  (2.15)  (17.83)  (-4.07)  (7.68)  (1.60)  (2.12)  (5.66) 
0.3929  0.3255  5.0848  -2.7592  2.4439  -0.3369  0.2540  1.2534  0.43 
(3.68)  (1.68)  (18.01)  (-6.77)  (8.31)  (-2.03)  (0.50)  (6.89) 
and  represents  the  discounted  earnings  in  the  near  future  as  a  proportion  of  distant  earnings;  PINT,  DIV,  and 
RDEP  are  the  ratio  to  gross  after-tax  cash  flows  of  interest,  dividends,  and  real  depreciation  charges,  respectively; 
CSALES  is  the  change  in  sales;  GRATE  and  CGRATE  are  the  gross  rate  of  return  and  the  change  in  gross  rate 
of  return,  respectively;  RIN V is the ratio  of gross  investment  to net capital  stock;  BLOAT],  BLOAT2,  and  BLOAT3 
are  the  ratio  to  gross  after-tax  cash  flows  of  inventory  profits,  the  difference  between  real  and  book  depreciation, 
and  the  difference  between  the  estimated  value  of  book  depreciation  and  what  firms  actually  report,  respectively. 
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Table  11.  Z Regressions, Model  4, Constant-Capital Case, Aggregate Internal Rate 
Discounting,  1959-77a 
Inidepenident 
Year anid 
per-iod  Mea,z Z  Conistanit  RISK  ORISK  FIVE  PINT  DIV  CDIV 
1959  0.9889  -0.0115  -0.8226  0.0294  -2.7081  0.7769  0.0858  -0.0204 
(-0.03)  (-1.64)  (0.85)  (-3.12)  (0.93)  (0.20)  (-0.13) 
1960  1.0023  0.0601  -0.2670  -0.0007  -0.7225  -0.  3050  0.1629  0.0162 
(0.14)  (-0.47)  (-0.03)  (-1.00)  (-0.51)  (0.41)  (0.13) 
1961  0.9684  0.2633  -0.3612  0.0151  -1.1349  -0.5122  0.1411  0.4679 
(0.70)  (-0.91)  (0.70)  (-1.75)  (-0.93)  (0.41)  (2.26) 
1962  0.9517  -0.3484  0.3923  -0.0537  0.5468  -0.  1537  0.2198  0.1978 
(-1.24)  (1.01)  (-2.01)  (1.21)  (-0.35)  (0.73)  (1.55) 
1963  0.9535  -0.3661  1.9272  -0.0101  0.4592  -0.1057  0.9752  0.2393 
(-0.93)  (5.14)  (-0.36)  (0.67)  (-0.19)  (2.50)  (1 .00) 
1964  0.9135  0.2025  1.2056  -0.0527  -0.7980  0.2781  0.3436  0.0527 
(0.59)  (3.19)  (-2.06)  (-1.24)  (0.57)  (1.03)  (0.26) 
1965  0.9925  0.2319  2.0892  -0.0495  -0.7049  0.4769  0.1679  0.1786 
(0.71)  (4.48)  (-1.59)  (-  1 . 00)  (1.05)  (0.50)  (1.44) 
1966  0.9770  -0.5121  1.5517  -0.0868  0.5207  0.3558  0.4176  0.0657 
(-1.28)  (2.62)  (-1.93)  (0.62)  (0.72)  (1.07)  (0.28) 
1967  0.9853  -0.2790  1.2539  0.0333  0.3289  0.1104  -0.3110  0.2128 
(-0.75)  (2.80)  (1.53)  (0.40)  (0.21)  (-0.79)  (0.88) 
1968  1.0422  0.3050  0.7455  0.0212  -0.0746  -0.0283  -0.1121  0.1928 
(0. 10)  (1.78)  (0.80)  (-0.  11)  (-0.07)  (-0.30)  (0.82) 
1969  0.9757  -0.0133  -0.8030  -0.0248  -0.7572  0.3259  -0.0995  -0.1008 
(-0.03)  (-1.60)  (-0.75)  (-1.05)  (0.73)  (-0.24)  (-0.40) 
1970  0.9476  -0.1534  -0.4323  0.0302  1.1098  -0.1035  0.2927  0.2468 
(-0.50)  (-1.09)  (1.76)  (2.21)  (-0.32)  (0.82)  (1.74) 
1971  0.9968  0.4598  -0.0047  0.0256  0.5962  -0.  6753  -0.4904  -1.0247 
(1.28)  (-0.01)  (1.65)  (1.22)  (-1.56)  (-1.27)  (-0.18) 
1972  0.9492  0.2436  -0.6669  0.0432  0.2682  -0.5154  -0.2401  0.0453 
(0.58)  (-1.63)  (2.23)  (0.43)  (-0.94)  (-0.47)  (0.27) 
1973  0.9339  0.5788  -3.0526  -0.0783  0.4955  -0.7791  -0.4177  0.0749 
(1.01)  (-3.52)  (-1.15)  (0.61)  (-1.17)  (-0.55)  (0.41) 
1974  1.0000  1.0083  -5.6260  -0.2448  -1.2045  0.1598  1.0036  0.3141 
(1.84)  (-4.18)  (-3.14)  (-1.42)  (0.45)  (1.92)  (1.11) 
1975  0.9912  -0.9959  -0.6010  0.0454  1.7515  -0.1644  1.1033  -0.2654 
(-2.88)  (-0.96)  (1.85)  (3.88)  (-0.44)  (2.39)  (-1.88) 
1976  0.9166  -0.7192  -0.6394  0.0127  1.7403  -0.1342  0.8792  -0.0388 
(-2.80)  (-1.93)  (0.71)  (5.20)  (-0.44)  (2.15)  (-0.34) 
1977  0.9613  -0.1410  -1.2092  0.1450  0.9818  0.0279  0.5224  -0.1341 
(-0.50)  (-3.31)  (14.02)  (2.26)  (0.09)  (1.45)  (-0.90) 
1961-77  0.9681  ...  0.0317  0.0499  0.9910  -0.1499  0.3041  0.0480 
(0.33)  (9.33)  (7.81)  (-1.48)  (3.16)  (1.17) 
1961-67  0.9631  ...  1.0283  0.0056  0.3371  0.0456  0.3157  0.2143 
(7.25)  (0.61)  (1.52)  (0.52)  (2.46)  (3.22) 
1968-77  0.9715  ...  -0.4504  0.0526  0.9950  -0.0465  0.2739  -0.0408 
(-3.15)  (7.75)  (5.91)  (-0.37)  (1.98)  (-0.80) 
Source:  Estimations  by the authors.  The  aggregate  internal  rate  used  in  the  discounting  is  from  the  column 
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CSALES  RDEP  GRATE  CGRATE  RINV  BLOAT]  BLOAT2  BLOAT3  GRO WTH  R2 
0.0599  2.6466  2.3721  0.5713  1.3424  -8.6496  -1.4423  -0.0881  ...  0.38 
(0.13)  (3.41)  (3.45)  (0.60)  (1.04)  (-1.13)  (-0.63)  (-0.16) 
0.4863  0.8767  1.8572  -1.1892  3.3188  -3.3174  0.6176  1.0243  ...  0.35 
(1.35)  (1.51)  (2.69)  (-1.03)  (3.57)  (-0.64)  (0.36)  (2.05) 
0.1163  1.2269  2.0575  -0.7364  1.3786  2.3196  -1.0280  1.0461  0.3861  0.41 
(0.30)  (2.62)  (2.33)  (-0.61)  (1.52)  (0.14)  (-0.71)  (2.58)  (0.24) 
0.5437  1.0798  2.7171  -3.0847  0.7999  -10.3018  2.8601  1.0824  -0.5977  0.46 
(1.60)  (2.67)  (4.31)  (-2.94)  (1.16)  (-1.57)  (2.36)  (3.05)  (-0.42) 
-0.2188  1.3617  0.9456  -0.8944  0.9359  0.2734  -0.0414  1.2941  4.6542  0.52 
(-0.62)  (2.92)  (1.17)  (-0.60)  (1.13)  (0.07)  (-0.03)  (2.93)  (2.29) 
0.3405  0.9572  2.1053  -2.8764  0.6588  1.7549  1.7262  1.2198  -0.2393  0.39 
(1.63)  (2.40)  (3.35)  (-2.59)  (0.97)  (0.70)  (1.15)  (3.22)  (-0.22) 
0.2040  0.5716  2.3447  -1.3334  2.0373  0.3523  1.5886  1.8470  -0.5046  0.52 
(0.69)  (1.36)  (3.74)  (-1.01)  (3.27)  (0.37)  (0.92)  (4.36)  (-0.41) 
0.5061  1.3247  2.4211  -1.8979  0.9139  1.2681  1.9235  1.2512  2.1638  0.47 
(1.29)  (2.69)  (3.09)  ( -1.29)  (1.37)  (1.02)  (0.88)  (2.69)  (1.24) 
0.4775  1.2039  2.5169  -3.4886  0.6271  0.9058  0.0468  1.5021  2.0400  0.54 
(1.42)  (2.30)  (2.79)  (-2.39)  (0.77)  (0.73)  (0.02)  (3.21)  (1.16) 
0.6673  1.3442  2.4762  -2.4865  0.1290  0.1250  -0.9238  1.5595  1.4887  0.42 
(2.12)  (2.98)  (3.17)  (-2.04)  (0.17)  (0.12)  (-0.45)  (3.58)  (0.95) 
0.7011  0.8235  3.6623  -4.3769  2.1701  -0.5724  1.7815  1.8610  0.4553  0.41 
(1.68)  (1.38)  (3.90)  (--2.35)  (2.21)  (-0.76)  (0.70)  (3.36)  (0.26) 
0.3778  -0.3006  1.8446  -2.2380  1.6958  -0.9992  3.9921  1.6916  1.6321  0.40 
(1.04)  (-0.65)  (2.34)  ( -1.70)  (1.76)  (-1.30)  (2.15)  (3.99)  (0.99) 
0.1213  -0.1680  2.1493  -4.1401  2.1901  -1.5537  1.3945  1.9712  1.9220  0.46 
(0.29)  (-0.31)  (2.09)  (-2.71)  (2.19)  (-1.99)  (0.67)  (4.08)  (0.83) 
-0.4070  0.1342  2.4531  1.7646  4.0082  -1.6103  -0.0562  2.3464  1.9181  0.44 
(-0.82)  (0.20)  (2.27)  (0.75)  (3.01)  (-1.81)  (-0.02)  (3.51)  (0.68) 
0.6637  0.1513  1.6816  -7.6907  3.7672  -0.9035  0.1121  1.3192  0.5734  0.41 
(1.13)  (0.17)  (1.34)  (-2.92)  (2.53)  (-1.52)  (0.04)  (1.39)  (0.19) 
0.0309  0.5478  -0.5997  -3.8319  4.0772  -0.0287  0.5878  2.9868  4.8977  0.45 
(0.11)  (0.73)  (-0.54)  (-3.05)  (3.95)  (-0.08)  (0.23)  (3.43)  (2.45) 
0.1340  1.5418  -0.4196  -2.8054  1.7693  -0.4399  -1.2779  2.5878  9.8149  0.52 
(0.42)  (2.42)  (-0.35)  (-2.55)  (1.68)  (-0.56)  (-0.73)  (3.47)  (3.40) 
0.1251  1.9855  0.4122  0.0190  0.4005  -0.0571  -2.4630  2.5683  4.9730  0.63 
(0.54)  (3.86)  (0.51)  (0.02)  (0.51)  (-0.13)  (-1.88)  (4.86)  (3.05) 
-0.0681  0.6365  -0.0647  0.5610  1.0827  -0.8398  -0.3870  1.9341  5.4164  0.76 
(-0.20)  (1.31)  (-0.09)  (0.40)  (1.32)  (-1.98)  (-0.31)  (3.92)  (3.67) 
0.2495  0.3623  2.0208  -1.9866  1.9829  -0.2129  1.2253  1.6179  1.4918  0.37 
(3.08)  (3.12)  (10.73)  (-6.43)  (9.60)  (-1.43)  (3.60)  (13.77)  (3.58) 
0.3102  0.9106  2.2738  -2.4988  1.2326  1.1700  1.1414  1.2742  0.4141  0.43 
(2.70)  (5.54)  (8.41)  (-5.64)  (4.61)  (2.05)  (2.02)  (8.35)  (0.76) 
0.2515  0.1234  2.2414  -2.2468  2.5692  -0.3747  2.0633  1.9228  2.6561  0.38 
(2.30)  (0.74)  (8.14)  (-5.38)  (8.35)  (-2.27)  (4.25)  (10.44)  (4.26) 
a.  For  a  description  of  model  4,  see  table  8,  note  a.  For  a  description  of  the  variables  see  table  10,  note  a.  The 
GRO WTH  variable  is the  percentage  change  in  the  firm's  net  capital  stock  betweeni  year  t and  t  -  3 multiplied  by 
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Table 12.  Z Regressions, Model  7, Constant-Capital Case, Aggregate Internal Rate 
Discounting,  1959_77a 
I,idepe,ide,it 
Year anid 
period  Mea'i  Z  Conistanit  RISK  ORISK  FI VE  PINT  DIV  CDI  V 
1959  0.9358  0.2650  0.4340  -0.0525  -0.5150  -0.3805  -0.1444  0.0049 
(0.64)  (0.70)  (-1.54)  (-0.71)  (-0.53)  (-0.37)  (0.03) 
1960  0.9810  -0.1340  0.4824  -0.0527  0.5055  -0.4882  0.0789  0.0005 
(-0.30)  (0.80)  (-1.34)  (0.73)  (-0.80)  (0.19)  (0. 00) 
1961  0.9054  0.3483  0.8852  -0.0151  -0.5141  -0.8268  -0.0606  0.3148 
(0.79)  (1.76)  (-0.47)  (-0.53)  (-1.44)  (-0.17)  (1.47) 
1962  0.9153  0.0835  0.1615  -0.0358  0.2790  -0.6128  0.0933  0.2635 
(0.25)  (0.32)  (-1.03)  (0.40)  (-1.33)  (0.32)  (1.89) 
1963  0.8819  0.0921  0.2124  -0.0358  0.0217  -0.3322  0.6549  0.1894 
(0.22)  (0.43)  (-1.04)  (0.03)  (-0.  63)  (1.78)  (0.84) 
1964  0.8688  0.3242  -0.5752  -0.0897  -0.4149  -0.0418  0.1343  -0.0543 
(0.99)  (-1.49)  (-3.42)  (-0.58)  (-0.  10)  (0.45)  (-0.31) 
1965  0.9618  0.3917  -0.6678  -0.0875  -0.1818  0.0448  -0.1417  0.1366 
(1.16)  (-1.53)  (-2.72)  (-0.23)  (0. 1 1)  (-0.43)  (1.20) 
1966  0.9826  -0.3451  -0.9546  -0.1113  0.7769  0.0345  -0.0052  0.0295 
(-0.76)  (-1.73)  (-2.37)  (0.81)  (0.07)  (-0.01)  (0.  12) 
1967  0.9216  0.1115  -0.3543  -0.0247  -0.4482  0.0122  -0.7437  0.2946 
(0.27)  (-0.69)  (-0.69)  (-0.44)  (0.02)  (-1.85)  (1.21) 
1968  1.0175  0.2108  -0.2178  0.0570  -0.2926  -0.2200  -0.3427  0.1098 
(0.54)  (-0.48)  (1.99)  (-0.37)  (-0.50)  (-0.86)  (0.46) 
1969  1.0107  0.4659  -0.7230  0.0118  -1.7651  -0.0801  -0.3388  -0.0283 
(1.01)  (-1.33)  (0.33)  (-2.22)  (-0.17)  (-0.73)  (-0.11) 
1970  0.9312  0.3480  0.0369  -0.0029  -0.4771  -0.1627  -0.0492  0.1801 
(1.01)  (0. 10)  (-0.14)  (-0.78)  (-0.52)  (-0.14)  (1.30) 
1971  0.9747  0.7700  0.6457  0.0185  -0.2530  -0.8210  -0.7976  -0.0202 
(2.07)  (1.89)  (0.98)  (-0.44)  (-1.97)  (-2.08)  (-0.15) 
1972  0.9406  0.6476  -0.3478  0.0158  -0.8510  -0.7711  -0.7451  0.0439 
(1.54)  (-0.91)  (0.70)  (-1.29)  (-1.51)  (-1.55)  (0.28) 
1973  1.0361  1.4849  -1.8927  -0.1190  -1.3075  -1.3817  -1.1005  0.1121 
(2.30)  (-2.67)  (-1.76)  (-1.50)  (-1.96)  (-1.37)  (0.61) 
1974  1.2069  1.6898  -1.9024  -0.2085  -1.8672  -0.5368  0.8498  0.2829 
(2.84)  (-1.72)  (-2.51)  (-2.33)  (-1.29)  (1.38)  (0.84) 
1975  0.9621  -0.2538  -0.0823  -0.0560  0.9448  -0.4906  1.0640  -0.1918 
(-0.73)  (-0.16)  (-1.55)  (2.07)  (-1.41)  (2.42)  (-1.42) 
1976  0.9083  -0.1159  -0.7357  0.0041  0.9258  -0.5748  0.9641  0.0290 
(-0.37)  (-2.08)  (0.17)  (2.17)  (-1.65)  (2.07)  (0.23) 
1977  0.9366  0.1677  -0.9029  -0.0396  0.7592  -0.1639  0.8860  0.0604 
(0.76)  (-3.88)  (-1.97)  (2.46)  (-0.68)  (3.30)  (0.55) 
1961-77  0.9563  .  ..  -0.  1296  -0.0106  0.0022  -0.2269  0.0947  0.0252 
(-1.26)  (-1.46)  (0.01)  (-2.29)  (1.01)  (0.63) 
1961-67  0.9176  ...  -0.1507  -0.0403  -0.0033  -0.  1008  0.0596  0.1700 
(-0.91)  (-3.42)  (-0.01)  (-0.58)  (0.49)  (2.65) 
1968-77  0.9834  ...  -0.1257  -0.0017  -0.0899  -0.1786  -0.0009  -0.0363 
(-0.95)  (-0.19)  (-0.47)  (-1.42)  (-0.01)  (-0.71) 
Source:  Same  as  table  1 1. 
a.  See  text  for  a  description  of  model  7.  The  variables  are  described  in  tables  10 and  11. The  numbers  in  paren- 
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variable 
CSALES  RDEP  GRATE  CGRATE  RINV  BLOAT]  BLOAT2  BLOAT3  GROWITH  R2 
0.4727  1.1889  1.9175  0.8455  2.2267  -4.5735  -1.9328  0.8215  0.0000  0.37 
(1.15)  (1.84)  (3.21)  (0.95)  (1.97)  (-0.69)  (-0.96)  (1.67)  (0.00) 
0.4547  -0.0864  2.4303  -1.0561  5.6115  -6.7646  1.4231  1.3087  0.0000  0.49 
(1.23)  (-0.15)  (3.43)  (-0.89)  (5.71)  (-1.28)  (0.77)  (2.53)  (0.00) 
0.7871  0.4302  3.0324  -1.9858  2.5400  0.9182  -1.7358  1.1623  -1.2913  0.52 
(1.86)  (0.92)  (3.30)  (-1.55)  (2.69)  (0.05)  (-1.01)  (2.77)  (-0.80) 
0.4769  0.5598  2.9995  -3.2950  1.9821  -5.3690  -0.9672  1.2162  -1.6501  0.54 
(1.27)  (1.35)  (4.30)  (-2.84)  (2.62)  (-0.75)  (-0.66)  (3.26)  (-1.09) 
0.0012  0.7204  1.7004  -1.0636  1.9601  -1.1784  -1.7940  1.4971  2.8041  0.50 
(0.00)  (1.71)  (2.20)  (-0.76)  (2.53)  (-0.31)  (-1.12)  (3.65)  (1.48) 
0.5296  0.5076  2.8795  -2.4489  1.5002  2.0628  -0.6669  1.2159  -1.1546  0.54 
(2.87)  (1.49)  (5.24)  ( -2.55)  (2.49)  (0.94)  ( -0.46)  (3.72)  ( -1.22) 
0.5464  -0.0093  2.8545  -1.4501  3.2435  0.4425  -1.0874  1.8882  -1.2810  0.62 
(1.84)  (-0.02)  (4.83)  (-1.17)  (5.42)  (0.50)  (-0.61)  (4.84)  (-1.13) 
0.5714  0.8459  3.2876  -2.3628  2.5320  1.2666  -0.9379  1.3862  0.7285  0.56 
(1.38)  (1.73)  (3.98)  (-1.54)  (3.68)  (0.99)  (-0.37)  (2.84)  (0.40) 
0.4359  1.0691  3.5785  -4.3423  1.4743  0.5365  -2.5537  1.3210  0.9787  0.55 
(1.31)  (2.20)  (3.87)  ( -2.87)  (1.89)  (0.44)  ( -1.00)  (2.91)  (0.56) 
0.7985  0.8798  3.3165  -2.2460  1.7677  -0.1850  -3.6762  1.5708  -0.0645  0.54 
(2.46)  (1.87)  (3.96)  ( -1.71)  (2.24)  (-0.18)  (-1.44)  (3.53)  (-0.04) 
0.6720  0.8562  4.3089  -4.1642  3.9880  -0.9565  -3.4482  1.9021  -0.8439  0.55 
(1.47)  (1.31)  (4.20)  (-2.09)  (3.81)  (-I.  18)  (-1.04)  (3.19)  (-0.44) 
0.5931  0.5026  3.4239  -3.1857  2.6643  -1.1685  -2.0427  1.4032  -0.9607  0.58 
(1.66)  (0.99)  (4.39)  (-2.  36)  (2.80)  (-1.54)  ( -0.92)  (3.21)  (-0.59) 
0.3132  0.3951  3.7508  -4.1512  2.4741  -2.0874  -3.3041  1.6369  -0.1394  0.63 
(0.74)  (0.68)  (3.76)  (-2.79)  (2.52)  (-2.75)  ( -1.  37)  (3.37)  (-0.06) 
-0.2037  0.5387  3.8289  2.1718  4.7319  -1.8044  -3.3995  2.1928  0.2382  0.61 
-0.44)  (0.82)  (3.70)  (1.00)  (3.84)  ( -2.17)  ( -1.24)  (3.37)  (0.09) 
1.1389  1.0729  3.1142  -8.7508  5.1286  -1.1015  -5.9066  1.5309  -1.6814  0.55 
(1.84)  (1.09)  (2.34)  (-3.11)  (3.33)  (-1.78)  ( -1.55)  (1.48)  (-0.53) 
0.2630  1.4209  0.4120  -4.9911  7.1550  -0.3099  -6.6677  4.0365  2.7315  0.57 
(0.77)  (1.50)  (0.31)  ( -3.40)  (5.58)  (-0.75)  ( -1.99)  (3.62)  (1.14) 
0.2489  3.9360  1.1676  -2.6454  2.2440  -0.4645  -10.4567  2.1481  3.5718  0.63 
(0.84)  (5.90)  (1.01)  ( -2.50)  (2.23)  (-0.63)  ( -5.49)  (3.04)  (1.31) 
0.3726  3.4094  1.6204  0.1983  1.2864  -0.5775  -9.0250  2.4182  0.2215  0.67 
(1.42)  (5.67)  (1.76)  (0.14)  (1.46)  (-1.16)  (-5.58)  (3.92)  (0.12) 
0.4253  2.0323  0.8859  -0.0456  1.7876  -0.4575  -5.6817  1.8174  -0.0415  0.71 
(1.69)  (5.27)  (1.60)  (-0.04)  (2.85)  (-1.44)  (-5.48)  (4.87)  (-0.04) 
0.4315  0.6952  3.3611  -2.8016  2.9888  -0.5817  -1.8892  1.3933  -0.3905  0.50 
(5.40)  (6.16)  (18.04)  (-9.19)  (14.69)  (-3.98)  (-5.57)  (12.12)  (-0.95) 
0.4600  0.5963  3.1032  -2.6619  2.2813  0.7229  -1.0171  1.2900  -0.7480  0.52 
(4.14)  (3.95)  (11.90)  (-6.23)  (8.77)  (1.32)  (-1.79)  (8.93)  (-1.44) 
0.4370  0.7663  3.7849  -3.3083  3.6540  -0.6838  -2.0237  1.7791  0.2162  0.52 
(3.97)  (4.59)  (13.69)  (-7.87)  (11.79)  (-4.14)  (-4.08)  (9.67)  (0.34) 490  Brookings PaDers on Economic  A ctivity, 2:1980 
Table 13.  Means and Standard Deviations for Independent Variables in Cross-Sectional 
Regressions,  1959_77a 
Inidepenident 
Year anid 
period  RISK  ORISK  FIVE  PINT  DIV  CDI V  CSALES 
1959  0.0298  2.1683  0.2605  0.0756  0.2738  0.1340  0.1213 
(0. 09)  (1.69)  (0.85)  (0.05)  (0.  I 1)  (0.31)  (0. 1 0) 
1960  0.0390  2.2476  0.2657  0.0895  0.2977  0.0801  0.0409 
(0.08)  (1.74)  (0.93)  (0.06)  (0.11)  (0.30)  (0.12) 
1961  0.0433  2.6144  0.2261  0.0873  0.2914  0.0469  0.0363 
(0.07)  (1.33)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.11)  (0.15)  (0.09) 
1962  0.0384  1.9876  0.2795  0.0889  0.2852  0.0728  0.0802 
(0.07)  (1.33)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.11)  (0.21)  (0.10) 
1963  0.0434  2.0714  0.2677  0.0850  0.2760  0.0720  0.0653 
(0.10)  (1.61)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.10)  (0.12)  (0.09) 
1964  0.0356  1.9145  0.2594  0.0782  0.2591  0.1020  0.0997 
(0.06)  (1.02)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.09)  (0.13)  (0.14) 
1965  0.0342  1.7390  0.2717  0.0788  0.2472  0.1356  0.1041 
(0.06)  (0.91)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.19)  (0.09) 
1966  0.0344  1.5151  0.3225  0.0898  0.2490  0.1288  0.0965 
(0.06)  (0.76)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.08) 
1967  0.0421  2.2657  0.2674  0.1069  0.2573  0.1017  0.0630 
(0.08)  (1.89)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.08)  (0.13)  (0.12) 
1968  0.0361  2.0421  0.2861  0.1156  0.2500  0.0734  0.0815 
(0.06)  (1.15)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.12)  (0.10) 
1969  0.0321  1.9385  0.3166  0.1345  0.2400  0.0615  0.0660 
(0.06)  (1.09)  (0.05)  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.14)  (0.09) 
1970  0.0372  2.5550  0.3107  0.1711  0.2408  0.0160  -0.0013 
(0.08)  (1.96)  (0.04)  (0.11)  (0.09)  (0.19)  (0.08) 
1971  0.0396  2.8780  0.2999  0.1579  0.2197  0.0042  0.0277 
(0.08)  (2.03)  (0.05)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.22)  (0.08) 
1972  0.0384  2.8483  0.2877  0.1415  0.1969  0.0374  0.0802 
(0.08)  (1 .97)  (0.05)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.18)  (0.07) 
1973  0.0246  1.2763  0.4091  0.1356  0.1656  0.1062  0.1057 
(0.04)  (0.66)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.23)  (0.09) 
1974  0.0254  0.8336  0.5753  0.1625  0.1579  0.1150  0.1048 
(0.04)  (0.43)  (0.05)  (0.11)  (0.08)  (0.12)  (0.14) 
1975  0.0342  1.8323  0.4350  0.1851  0.1829  0.0567  -0.0401 
(0.07)  (1.56)  (0.07)  (0.10)  (0.07)  (0.22)  (0.12) 
1976  0.0337  1.9780  0.3927  0.1561  0.1758  0.1365  0.0700 
(0.09)  (1.46)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.20)  (0.11) 
1977  0.0311  1.7828  0.4363  0.1565  0.1834  0.1665  0.0645 
(0.08)  (2.33)  (0.06)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.14)  (0.07) 
1961-77  0.0355  2.0038  0.3330  0.1249  0.2262  0.0832  0.0649 
(0.076)  (1.60)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.18)  (0.11) 
1961-67  0.0388  2.0146  0.2761  0.0875  0.2644  0.0931  0.0779 
(0.08)  (1.45)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.10)  (0.16)  (0.11) 
1968-77  0.0332  1.9962  0.3727  0.1510  0.1995  0.0763  0.0558 
(0.08)  (1.69)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.19)  (0.11) 
Source:  Calculations  by  the  authors. 
a.  For  a  description  of  the  variables  see  notes  to  table  10.  The  numbers  in  parentheses  are  standard  deviations. W. Brainard, J. Shoven, and L. Weiss  491 
variable 
RDEP  GRATE  CGRATE  RINV  BLOAT]  BLOAT2  BLOAT3  GRO WVTH 
0.4254  0.1786  0.0144  0.0891  -0.0053  0.0845  -0.0167  ... 
(0.16)  (0.09)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0. 00)  (0.05)  (0.09) 
0.4516  0.1651  -0.0134  0.0972  -0.0079  0.0793  -0.0138 
(0.17)  (0.08)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.00)  (0.05)  (0.01) 
0.4421  0.1612  -0.0039  0.0815  0.0019  0.0657  -0.0241  0.0253 
(0.16)  (0.07)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.04)  (0.10)  (0.03) 
0.4297  0.1656  0.0048  0.0855  -0.0039  0.0587  -0.0308  0.0222 
(0.16)  (0.08)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.04)  (0.10)  (0.02) 
0.4133  0.1674  0.0017  0.0882  0.0083  0.0508  -0.0270  0.0224 
(0.15)  (0.07)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.09)  (0.02) 
0.3794  0.1764  0.0089  0.0920  0.0141  0.0427  -0.0249  0.0296 
(0.13)  (0.07)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.08)  (0.03) 
0.3531  0.1849  0.0085  0.1042  0.0294  0.0368  -0.0214  0.0368 
(0.13)  (0.07)  (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.07)  (0.03) 
0.3560  0.1804  -0.0045  0.1165  0.0272  0.0391  -0.0174  0.0431 
(0,13)  (0.07)  (0,02)  (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.07)  (0.03) 
0.3781  0.1671  -0.0133  0.1049  0.0312  0.0475  -0.0279  0.0427 
(0.14)  (0.07)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.07)  (0.03) 
0.3817  0.1720  0.0048  0.0965  0.0370  0.0512  -0.0253  0.0424 
(0.14)  (0.07)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.07)  (0.03) 
0.3938  0.1665  -0.0055  0.1007  0.0657  0.0597  -0.0112  0.0393 
(0.15)  (0.07)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.03) 
0.4399  0.  1444  -0.0220  0.0928  0.0499  0.0758  -0.0098  0.0334 
(0.16)  (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.02) 
0.4403  0.  1424  -0.0019  0.0827  0.0583  0.0850  -0.0081  0.0302 
(0.16)  (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.02) 
0.4208  0.  1492  0.0067  0.0793  0.0668  0.0840  -0.0025  0.0267 
(0.15)  (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.02) 
0.3640  0.1671  0.0178  0.0883  0.1492  0.0744  0.0001  0.0349 
(0.13)  (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.09)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.02) 
0.3684  0.1641  -0.0029  0.0934  0.1789  0.0919  0.0040  0.0458 
(0.  15)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.  14)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
0.4825  0.1334  -0.0307  0.0783  0.0566  0.1521  0.0019  0.0326 
(0.18)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.02) 
0.4563  0.1433  0.0099  0.0785  0.0666  0.1445  0.0062  0.0330 
(0.17)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.02) 
0.4510  0.1452  0.0019  0.0835  0.0635  0.1431  0.0024  0.0261 
(0.16)  (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.02) 
0.4132  0.1594  -0.0011  0.0914  0.0518  0.0779  -0.0135  0.0330 
(0.  16)  (0.07)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.03) 
0.3957  0.1709  0.0003  0.0967  0.0148  0.0493  -0.0257  0.0316 
(0.15)  (0.08)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.09)  (0.03) 
0.4255  0.1513  -0.0021  0.0877  0.0777  0.0980  -0.0049  0.0340 
(0.17)  (0.07)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.03) 492  Brookings PaDers on Economic  Activity, 2:1980 
model 4 this process is a random walk; hence the own risk associated 
with future earnings depends on how distant they are in the future. Spe- 
cifically, 
ORISKt  =  Ix E  (  l  c  ,K  T  /  2?  cL  E(cash  paiyout), 
,r= 0(1  +  Rf)T  r=  (1 +  Rf)T 
The coefficients on RISK for the three sets of  regressions show the 
same general variation over time, decreasing (becoming more negative) 
in the 1970s and reaching an absolute minimum in 1974. Firms that are 
riskier by the CAPM-based measure bear a larger discount in the latter 
part of the sample. The results for the cash-out case  (table  10)  appear 
to be the most satisfactory. Through 1967 the coefficients are of mixed 
sign and never significant; from  1968  on they are always negative and 
significant in six years. The coefficient in the pooled  regression for the 
first subsample is not significantly different from zero; in the second sub- 
sample it has a value of -3.8  and a t-statistic of -6.17.  Perhaps surpris- 
ingly, the effect of RISK is not much smaller than that implied in regres- 
sions based on 5, in which time and risk discounts are the only variables 
allowed to affect the valuation of a firm's  earnings stream. The coefficients 
on RISK in the constant-capital case show the same general variation over 
time as in the cash-out case, but their level is less satisfactory. Although 
the coefficient on RISK is negative in the last six years of the sample and 
significantly so in three of these years, the coefficient is positive and often 
significant between  1962  and  1968.  One  explanation  of  this perverse 
result is as follows. These years form the peak of the market's gross rate- 
of-return series as measured by Feldstein  and Summers (see  table  1). 
The rate-of-return forecast underlying the Z calculations in the constant- 
capital case assumes that the market's gross rate of return follows a first- 
order autoregressive process and asymptotically returns to 11.1 percent. 
If investors believed that the peak cash flows of the mid-sixties were less 
transitory than this process implies, they would have valued securities 
more highly than our intrinsic values, giving those firms with the largest 
covariance with the market rate the greatest overvaluation. Thus, if this 
scenario is correct, firms with large CAPM risk will also be systematically 
more valuable relative to our estimates of intrinsic value. Similarly, high- 
risk firms should be undervalued in periods of below-average aggregate 
return. To examine this hypothesis, we ran Z regressions, not reported W. Brainard. J. Shoven, and L. Weiss  493 
here, in which investors' expectations of the market return were assumed 
to follow a random walk. As would be expected if this explanation were 
correct, the resulting coefficients were negative in 1962-65  and less nega- 
tive (and in some cases positive) in the 1970s. 
These results make clear the difficulty of distinguishing between the ef- 
fect of risk and expectations errors if a firm's rate of return is assumed to 
be related to the aggregate by the same coefficient that determines its risk. 
Any  errors in forecasting the  aggregate expected  return automatically 
induce a correlation between Z  and the risk measure. This problem is 
probably less severe in the cash-out case because the distant future, when 
differences in the expected rate of return for the two processes are great- 
est, receives less weight. This explanation is supported by the results for 
model 7 reported in table 12. In model 7 the intrinsic value calculations 
do not depend on the aggregate rate of return, and consequently there 
is no reason to believe that errors in our forecast of expected return are 
correlated with the risk measure. The coefficients for risk in this case are 
never significantly positive  and become  significantly negative in  1973, 
1976, and 1977. 
Although diversifiable risk is not supposed to matter according to the 
capital-asset pricing model,  various authors find that it has  a negative 
effect. In the cash-out case, ORISK typically has a negative sign and is 
highly significant in the earlier half of the sample. This pattern of signifi- 
cance is just the reverse of that for RISK-the  market appears to assign 
relatively less weight to  diversifiable risk and relatively more to syste- 
matic risk in the second half of the sample. According to our estimates 
for that part of the sample, eliminating own risk would have roughly the 
same effect on market value as eliminating nondiversifiable risk. 
In the constant-capital case the coefficients on ORISK, like those on 
RISK, are unsatisfactory. A natural explanation is that model 4, which 
makes the extreme assumption that the firm-specific error follows  a ran- 
dom walk, induces a correlation between ORISK (which varies inversely 
with intrinsic value)  and Z. Again, the importance of this error should 
be greater in the constant-capital than in the cash-out case. The results 
for model 7 should not be as vulnerable to this problem. As can be seen 
in table 12, the coefficients on ORISK for this case tend to be negative 
and are significantly so in four years. However, in contrast to RISK, they 
do seem less important  in the second half of the sample. 494  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1980 
EFFECTS  OF  ANTICIPATED  INFLATION 
It is often argued that, under current U.S. tax laws, inflation increases 
the real tax burden on  corporate capital and thus affects valuation of 
corporate securities. Our procedure is designed to capture the effects of 
anticipated inflation on  after-tax cash flows under the assumption that 
before-tax cash flows are invariant to  changes in  anticipated inflation. 
Inflation alters the real tax liabilities of the firm in three ways: by pro- 
ducing nominal inventory profits for firms on FIFO, by permitting firms 
to charge as an expense nominal interest charges, and by using historical 
cost for calculation of depreciation allowances. 
Changes in anticipated inflation may affect future after-tax cash flows 
and hence asset values in ways not immediately apparent from measures 
of current flows. A one-time increase in expected inflation will gradually 
reduce the real value of  depreciation charges, bringing them to  a new 
steady state after the time required to depreciate the existing capital stock 
completely. Thus, if the real capitalization rate remained unchanged, the 
ratio of market value to after-tax profits in the current period would fall 
immediately after a change in anticipated inflation. 
To illustrate this effect, consider a firm that maintains a constant stock 
of capital with a twenty-year useful lifetime, purchasing one unit of capi- 
tal each year. If straight-line depreciation is used, the real value of nomi- 
nal depreciation charges in each year is 
1  20 e_rt  dt  (1  e-20ro) 
20 JO  20rO 
when the historical inflation is the constant 70* The present value of the 
tax savings is the annuity value of this stream multiplied by the marginal 
tax rate on corporate income. A rise in the anticipated inflation from 5.0 
to 10.0 percent will reduce the steady-state flow, and thus the value of tax 
savings by 31.5 percent. There will be, however, no instantaneous effect 
on the real flow. The real value of the nominal depreciation charge is 
IT  e7lt  dt+ 
20  e-71-T0(t-T)  d 
~20  Jr  20 
when the inflation rate changed from 7r to 7r,  T  years ago. After a single 
year, for example, a rise in anticipated inflation from 5.0 to 10.0 percent W. Brainard, J. Shoven, and L. Weiss  495 
will reduce the real value of the flow by 4.8 percent, and after five years 
the flow will be reduced by 18.2 percent. If the real discount rate is un- 
altered by  changes in  expected  inflation, the  effect on  the  discounted 
stream of depreciation charges will be an average of  the relatively low 
initial effect and the greater future amounts. At a 3.0 percent real discount 
rate the present value of future real depreciation charges in our example 
will fall by 20.8  percent at the moment the inflation rate changes, which 
is about two-thirds of the steady-state effect. 
The magnitude of this effect on market valuation is related to the im- 
portance of nominal depreciation charges. In 1973, book depreciation for 
our sample averaged about 45 percent of net cash flows. Thus, for the hy- 
pothetical real discount rate of 3 percent, a rise in anticipated inflation 
from 5.0 to 10.0 percent would reduce the value of a typical firm by the 
marginal tax rate multiplied by 20.8 percent multiplied by book deprecia- 
tion divided by net cash flow, or about 4.4 percent at a marginal tax rate 
of 0.48.  Because this calculation probably understates the real discount 
rate and because it is hard to imagine a 5 percent change in the expected 
long-run inflation rate in one year, the calculation suggests only a minor 
role for this effect in the market decline between 1973 and 1974. 
The explanatory variable, BLOAT2,  measures the difference between 
our estimates of  real and book  depreciation divided by gross after-tax 
cash flow and, in a given year, varies across firms proportionately with 
the average age of existing capital. A significant coefficient for this vari- 
able in the Z regressions can be given various interpretations. An ultra- 
rational view would  attribute this coefficient to market anticipations of 
inflation different from those we have assumed. A negative coefficient, for 
example, could imply that the market anticipates higher inflation than we 
assume and thus lower after-tax returns. A more prosaic interpretation 
would attribute  this coefficient to investors either being fooled by reported 
income statements or disagreeing with our adjustment for inflation. A 
positive coefficient, for example, wouldl imply that investors believe re- 
ported book figures or that we have overstated the difference between re- 
placement cost and book depreciation. 
The results from our cross-sectional regressions are ambiguous about 
the consistency of our depreciation adjustments and the market's view. 
For model  4,  in both the  cash-out  and constant-capital cases  the  co- 
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but significant in several of the pooled  regressions. The coefficients for 
model  7,  on  the  other  hand,  are  typically  negative  but  insignificant 
through 1974. The coefficient is significantly negative in the last years of 
our sample. 
As  mentioned above,  not  all tax effects of  inflation are harmful to 
holders of corporate capital. Because  nominal interest charges are de- 
ductible as an expense, inflation reduces the real tax liability of the firm 
to the extent that nominal interest rates rise with anticipation of inflation. 
A  precise calculation  of  this effect  requires an  assumption about  the 
future debt policy of the firm, which in the absence of  a well-accepted 
optimal policy is somewhat arbitrary. 
In our calculations we assume that firms finance a constant fraction 
of new capital expenditures with debt. If all debt has the same maturity, 
the real value of debt outstanding will decline with anticipated inflation; 
interest payments represent in part repayment of principal. This decline 
in the real value of debt will diminish the advantage inflation provides 
through this channel compared with a policy that holds constant the real 
value of debt. For sufficiently high inflation rates, increases in inflation 
will actually reduce tax savings from debt. 
To  illustrate this effect, consider a firm that, as before,  maintains a 
constant-capital stock adding one unit of capital each year and financing 
a fraction, b, of new capital with twenty-year bonds. For a constant in- 
flation rate,  0,  the real value of debt is equal to 
b 
20 
e-rot  dt =  b(1-e  o) 
o  ~~~~~~~ro 
which declines with expected inflation. At  a real interest rate of  p, the 
real value of interest payments is 
b (Or  +  P)  (1  _  e-20, 
which, for a low positive interest rate, rises and then falls with inflation. 
A rise in inflation of 5.0 to  10.0 percent will raise the steady-state cash 
flow by 1  1.1 percent with p equal to 3.0 percent. By comparison, if a firm 
had a policy of maintaining constant real value of outstanding debt, the 
change in the real stream would be proportional to the change in nominal 
interest rates, or 62.5 percent. 
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be drawn out over time. The value of real interest charges T  years after 
a change in inflation from  7r0  to 7r1  is given by 
b [(7r  +  p)  e--lt  dt +  (7ro  +  p)  e-1rir-Tro(t-T) dt]. 
The present value of this stream will increase by about 7.8  percent at 
the instant that inflation increases from 5.0 to 10.0 percent, compared with 
the steady-state rise of 11.0 percent. Because about 30 percent of net cash 
flows is distributed as interest, a rise in expected inflation can be expected 
to increase the aggregate value of corporate securities by 0.30  multiplied 
by 7.80  percent multiplied by 0.48,  or about  1.1 percent. A  policy  of 
maintaining the real value of  debt through time would induce a much 
larger effect: 0.300 multiplied by 0.625  multiplied by 0.480,  or 9 percent. 
The consistency between our adjustments to future after-tax earnings 
and the market's assessment is tested in the regression by our inclusion 
of the variable PINT, which is defined as the ratio of interest to gross after- 
tax cash flows. This variable also provides a test of the first part of the 
Modigliani and Cohn hypothesis:  that equity holders fail  to  take into 
account the gain resulting from the depreciation in the real value of nomi- 
nal liabilities in inflationary environments. They believe  this factor has 
been increasingly important in recent years as inflation has accelerated 
and that it has contributed to the observed market decline. A test of this 
theory is to examine whether those firms with high debt-equity ratios are 
undervalued relative to equity-financed firms with similar earnings char- 
acteristics. If firms have similar age and maturity structures of their finan- 
cial liabilities, PINT is a proxy for the debt-equity ratio of the firm. With 
this interpretation, the Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis would imply that the 
coefficient on PINT would be negative and increasing in absolute value 
during the  1970s.  In fact,  all our results show  that the coefficient on 
PINT is small, trendless, and insignificant in all years except one. Con- 
trary to  the  Modigliani-Cohn  hypothesis,  firms with  interest-intensive 
cash flows and high debt-equity ratios do  not  appear to  be  especially 
undervalued in the market in the  1970s.  However,  this  test is  biased 
against acceptance of that hypothesis to the extent that firms are expected 
to maintain  their ratios of real debt to capital. 
There is a part of the Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis that fares better: 
investors discount corporate cash flows at the nominal rather than at the 
real rate of interest. Our results are at least consistent with this second 498  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1980 
part because it could be argued that the risk-free internal rates of return 
that we display in table 9 more closely resemble nominal bond rates than 
anyone's estimates of real rates. 
The effects of inflation on taxation of inventory profits is qualitatively 
similar to the treatment of  depreciation charges. However, because in- 
ventory is turned over much faster, the transition effects will be negligible 
and the instantaneous effect on asset values will be close to the steady- 
state effects. From table 13 the estimated inventory valuation adjustment 
BLOAT]  for  our  sample  appears  to  be  approximately  6.4  percent 
(in  1977)  of gross and 11.6 percent of net after-tax cash flow. Because 
this is proportional to realized inflation, 6.8  percent in  1977,  a change 
from 5.0  to  10.0  percent in anticipated inflation could  be expected  to 
double average inventory valuation adjustment from 8.5 to 17 percent of 
net cash flows. This would reduce steady-state after-tax cash flows and 
hence the value of corporate capital by about 4 percent. The puzzle, of 
course, is why firms choose  to pay this voluntary tax when they could 
avoid it by changing their accounting method. The variable BLOAT]  in 
our regressions measures the ratio of inventory valuation adjustment to 
gross cash flows. As in the case of BLOAT2,  a significant value of this 
coefficient can be interpreted as an indication that investors' expectations 
about inflation differ from our assumptions, that there is accounting illu- 
sion, or that there are errors in our calculations of the inventory adjust- 
ment itself. The estimated coefficient is typic-ally  negative after 1968,  al- 
though not significantly so except in the pooled regressions. This suggests 
that, if anything, our adjustments for inventory profits are smaller than 
the market's  in the second half of our sample period. 
VALUATION  OF  DISTANT  FUTURE  EARNINGS 
AND  THE  IMPORTANCE  OF  RENTS 
Several variables included in the regressions provide information about 
the relative importance, and changes in importance, of future earnings 
to the current valuation of the firm. The most straightforward variable 
to interpret is FIVE, which is simply the ratio of the present value of the 
first five years of gross cash flows to the present value of the entire future 
stream of returns: 
F  =l  GCF)  /r  GCF) 
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The coefficient on this variable indicates whether distant future earn- 
ings are valued more or less highly than they are in our calculation of in- 
trinsic value. A positive coefficient would indicate an upward-sloping term 
structure (we  have assumed a level  structure)  or pessimism relative to 
our projections about distant future earnings. 
This  variable should  have  the  best  chance  in  the  constant-capital 
cases reported in tables 11 and 12. There appears to be no obvious rela- 
tion between this coefficient and the term structure of nominal interest 
rates. Furthemore, although the variable is significantly positive in 1975- 
77,  it is hard to  argue that it is capturing an "end of  the world" psy- 
chology during the period of the market's sharpest decline. For model 4 
the variable is not significant in 1973 and is negative (although insignifi- 
cant)  in  1974.  For  model  7  the  coefficient is  significantly negative in 
1974.  For  both  models,  however,  the  coefficient does  become  signifi- 
cantly positive in 1975-77. 
The most important variable for reconciling market value  with our 
estimate of intrinsic value is the gross rate of return itself. The coefficient 
estimates are typically positive,  indicating that this  variable may well 
reflect the presence of intangible assets such as trademarks, patents, mo- 
nopoly  power, or key personnel, which contribute to  measured profit- 
ability. The fact that the coefficient on this variable is much greater in 
the cash-out than in the constant-capital case suggests that those assets 
do  not depreciate as  quickly as the  tangible assets we  measured. For 
both models considered, the coefficient on GRATE is positive and usually 
significant until 1974.  From  1974  on, however, the coefficient is much 
smaller; in the constant-capital cases, it is never significant. This pattern 
is consistent with the view that the market believes the quasi-rents that 
had been important in earlier periods are not very likely to continue. The 
negative, and frequently significant, coefficient on the change in GRATE 
suggests that the market regards recent changes as more transitory than 
our projections do. As would be expected under this interpretation, the 
coefficients are typically smaller in  absolute value  for model  7,  which 
uses lagged GRATE  in forecasting future earnings, than for  model  4, 
which assumes a random walk for the firm-specific  error. 
The variable GROWTH is included in the constant-capital regressions 
to examine whether estimated net rates of return contribute more to the 
market value of firms with high growth rates than those with low rates. 
The GROWTH variable is defined as the percentage change in the firm's 
net capital stock between year t and year t -  3 multiplied by the firm's net 500  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1980 
rate of return in year t. The coefficients on GROWTH are insignificant 
for most of the sample, but become larger and significant in the last four 
years for model 4. In model 7, on the other hand, in which GROWTH 
presumably adds less  information  about future expected  returns, it  is 
never significant. 
OTHER  VARIABLES  AFFECTING  MARKET  VALUES 
The  other explanatory variables included in our regressions are in- 
tended to control for factors that are omitted in our estimates of intrinsic 
value. These factors may be important because they provide information 
about expectations of future cash flows, because they affect the valuation 
of these earnings, or because they offset errors we have introduced in our 
calculations. The coefficient on the DIV variable (the ratio of dividends 
to gross after-tax cash flows) tends to be positive and is significant for the 
pooled sample for model 4. The magnitude of DIV is particularly large 
and significant in the last four years of our sample. In model 7, however, 
the coefficient on dividends has mixed signs and is not significant in the 
pooled regressions. Because dividends were used in model 7 to forecast 
expected earnings, this comparison of results suggests that dividends are 
serving as a proxy for expected return rather than as a preferred means 
of receipt in model 4. Even in model 7, however, the value of dividends 
increased markedly during the last three years of the sample. It may not 
be too  fanciful to suggest that this reflects the market's preference for 
receiving cash over investment in physical capital, which is perceived, 
on average, to be an unattractive use of funds. 
The BLOA T3 variable is the difference between our estimated value 
of book depreciation and what the firms actually report (again, scaled by 
gross after-tax cash flows).  The variable takes on a positive value if our 
depreciation lives  are too  short, which would  also  cause  our intrinsic 
value measures to be underestimates of the cash-flow value of the firm. 
The  regressions reliably obtain positive  and significant coefficients for 
this variable (especially for the constant-capital case),  suggesting that the 
variable is capturing  our errors in estimating useful lives. 
RINV  is the ratio of gross investment to net capital stock. One can 
rationalize either a positive relation between this variable and profitability 
(as  firms expand to  take  advantage of  favorable opportunities),  or  a 
negative relation reflecting the fact that as firms expand they move down W. Brainard, J. Shoven, and L. Weiss  501 
their schedules of marginal efficiency of capital. The regressions in table 3 
forecasting rates of return indicate that initially the former effect domi- 
nates, but that after a few years it disappears. The Z regression results of 
tables 10 and 11 indicate that investment is quite consistently rewarded 
with higher market  valuations. 
Conclusions 
Observers have offered several explanations for the dramatic decline 
in the financial valuation of the U.S. corporate capital stock relative to its 
total return, earnings plus interest. These include ( 1 )  a riskier economic 
environment (that is, greater uncertainty about the return on capital),  or 
increased aversion to risk, (2)  an increased tax burden on corporate earn- 
ings as a result of inflation, (3)  valuation confusion caused by inflation, 
and (4)  a decrease in expected rates of return-for  example, from higher 
energy prices or the added burden of government regulation. The calcu- 
lations made for our sample of  187 firms using a variety of models for 
forecasting future earnings confirm a large decline in market value rela- 
tive to the present value of the after-tax cash flows, with either a constant 
real rate or an inflation adjusted bond rate. Put another way, the real dis- 
count rate required to equate market and present values has shown a dra- 
matic increase from an average of less than 5 percent in the last half of 
the 1960s to an average of more than 10 percent in 1974-79. 
These results do not arise because our projections of future earnings 
are particularly optimistic. The sharp decline in Z appears even with our 
most pessimistic projections, which assume a continuation of the low, by 
historical standards, before-tax rates of return experienced in the latter 
part of the sample period. Although these rates presumably already in- 
corporate the effects of past energy price increases, the market may expect 
even further deterioration. It is unfortunate that our cross-sectional data 
provide no more information about the possibility of future energy hikes 
and their likely effects than do aggregate data. 
Cross-sectional data do  contain information that can be used to  as- 
sess the importance of increased risk discounts or the Modigliani-Cohn 
"inflation confusion" in explaining the  decline  in market value.  Firms 
differ in their vulnerability to fluctuations in the aggregate rate of return. 
Hence if investors perceive increased risk to the aggregate, it should show 502  Brookings Papers on Econiomic Activity, 2:1980 
up differentially among firms. Similarly, if bondholders recognize the ef- 
fect of inflation on the real value of their claims, but equity holders fail to 
recognize that the inflation component of nominal interest payments are 
effectively repayment of principle, debt-intensive firms should be syste- 
matically undervalued. 
We find that if nondiversifiable risk is the only variable, besides a time 
discount, allowed to explain cross-firm variation it appears to be quite im- 
portant in explaining the market's decline in 1974. However, it does little 
to  explain the level  of  the  market thereafter. Our year-by-year cross- 
sectional regressions for Z provide a more powerful test of the importance 
of risk, forcing it to compete with variables that could capture inflation 
illusion or other influences on market value. The estimated coefficients on 
the two risk measures used in these regressions indicate that they are im- 
portant in explaining market value, but that changes in their importance 
do not explain much of the puzzle. For example, in our preferred model 
(constant  capital,  model  7)  our estimates imply that together the  in- 
creases in risk discounts explain only 4 percent of the decline in market 
value between  1965  and  1974.  A  comparison of the coefficients of the 
different earnings models also makes clear the difficulty of distinguishing 
between the effect of nondiversifiable risk and errors in forecasting future 
rates of return. 
The variable PINT, which is intended to reveal the presence of infla- 
tion  confusion  by  equity holders,  is  even  less  successful  than  risk in 
explaining the market decline. The coefficient on PINT is small, trendless, 
and insignificant  in all except one year. 
General pessimism about the future is perhaps the hardest to infer from 
cross-sectional analysis. However, changes over time in the coefficients on 
several variables do suggest such a loss of confidence. Firms that we esti- 
mate to have a relatively high fraction of present value from returns more 
than five years in the future are relatively undervalued late in the sample, 
as are firms that have had historically high net rates of return. Perhaps 
even  our  most pessimistic  earnings projections have  not  reflected the 
fears of the market. What does seem clear is that measurable character- 
istics of firms and conventional methods of projecting future earnings are 
not likely to explain the declines in market values that have occurred dur- 
ing the 1970s. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Phillip Cagan: The stock market has lately become a subject of intensi- 
fied research to discover why real stock prices are so low in an inflation- 
ary environment. In the traditional view, stocks protect against inflation 
and should be bid up relative to  earnings when inflation escalates. As 
Brainard, Shoven, and Weiss show, the market value of companies rela- 
tive to replacement cost of capital (the q ratio)  fell by more than half 
from 1968 to  1977.  There is no reason to deny the personal interest of 
many of us in the research on this development. Many of us have been 
acquiring common  stocks for our CREF  retirement pensions  over  the 
past dozen years at low prices and are wondering whether (indeed, anx- 
iously hoping  that)  q will  return to  its  long-run equilibrium value  of 
around unity, thus raising the value of our pensions dramatically by the 
time we retire. 
The future behavior of stocks will depend on the reason for the initial 
decline in q. A priori there are many possible reasons for such a decline. 
Real corporate earnings per unit of capital could have declined because 
of increased energy costs and higher tax rates related to inflation, or re- 
ported earnings could be overstated because of  inflation. Other studies 
have reported a decline in rates of return on corporate capital after taxes 
and after adjustments for rising replacement costs, but the decline does 
not appear large enough  to  explain the fall  in market value,  and the 
authors also estimate that the after-tax net rate of return declined by a 
quarter  from 8 percent a year in 1968 to 6 percent in 1977 (table 1, over- 
looking 1973-74),  which would account for only half of the correspond- 
ing decline in q. Some of this decline in rate of return can be attributed to 
higher taxes pushed up by inflation, which proposals to reduce corporate 
tax rates seek to reverse. The remainder of the decline in rate of return 
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is unexplained, but any part due to OPEC will not be reversed by re- 
duced energy costs in the near future. 
Later in the paper, however, the authors derive internal rates of  re- 
turn, which generally show a doubling over the  1968-77  period. This 
implies that average returns to capital explain none of the decline in q. 
A large part or all of the decline in q therefore reflects a decline in the 
market value of corporate capital and earnings, which is usually attrib- 
uted to a change in risk or in its price. The authors provide a variety of 
ingenious measures of risk, which they estimate from a cross section of 
187 firms eaclh  year from 1958 to 1977. I have doubts that 187 firms are 
enough to give a good representation of the market, given the accounting 
and capital differences one finds between various manufacturing indus- 
tries, utilities, retail trade, services,  airlines, railroads, and companies 
owning minerals or timberlands. It would be  desirable to  increase the 
sample and reduce the disparity. (I have found 485 manufacturing firms 
on the compustat tape, which had data available since  1965  or before 
and did not have major mergers or average acquisitions over 10 percent 
a year of capital.) 
But even with a limited sample, the authors' results are intriguing and 
quite plausible. They first calculate internal rates of return without ad- 
justment for risk; these rates equate the discounted stream of future earn- 
ings (projected by various methods)  to the present market value of the 
firm (equity and all debt).  The internal rate doubled from 4.6 percent a 
year in 1968 to 9.3 percent in 1977  (see table 7 for "constant capital," 
which represents the normal view of firms as continuing indefinitely rather 
than being terminated when present capital wears out).  This rise matches 
a halving of q, and implies that projected future earnings per dollar of 
capital have not declined. 
The authors then calculate an internal rate adjusted for risk. The risk 
adjustment for each year is estimated from differences among a cross 
section of firms in the nondiversifiable risk of their future returns. If firms 
with a high risk relative to the average have relatively high internal rates of 
return for a particular year, the cross-sectional regression equation will 
assign an important role to the risk adjustment. If the size of this risk ad- 
justment were to rise over the years, it could help explain the rise in the 
unadjusted internal rates. 
The risk adjustment does rise in 1973-74  (table 9),  yet explainis  only 
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the adjustment declines thereafter. Consequently, the rise in the unad- 
justed rate between 1968 and 1977 is not reduced at all by this estimate 
of risk. 
In subsequent tables in which regression equations are calculated for 
the internal rate of return each year on company betas, own risk, and a 
string of other variables, the estimated coefficients for the beta and own- 
risk terms do not help to explain most of the rise in the unadjusted rates 
of return. 
In this part of the study, therefore, a negative answer would be given 
by tests of whether risk as indicated by cross-sectional differences among 
firms has increased over the years and whether risk would explain the de- 
cline in real stock prices over the period. The negative finding shows that 
the decline in stocks was not led by firms that the market treated as hav- 
ing relatively high risk. I am not surprised by this result, because there 
was never any indication that the prices of stocks displayed such differen- 
tial behavior in those years. But it is reassuring to have this thorough 
analysis, subject to the qualification that the sample may not be repre- 
sentative. 
By  elimination,  one  is  left  with  the  implication that market values 
have declined relative to returns and capital and that for some reason 
the market rate of discount rose, either because of a mistaken use of the 
higher nominal-rather  than the  largely unchanged real-rates  of  in- 
terest on bonds or because of an increase in the price of a given degree of 
risk or in the perceived riskiness of returns from corporate capital in gen- 
eral. Although this study combines the equity and nonequity return to 
capital, it is probably true that most of the decline in market valuation 
applies to the equity portion. I do not know of a satisfactory way to test 
whether the perceived risk of all corporate capital has increased relative 
to other forms of investment. We shall have to wait another ten years or 
so to see what happens, and even then we may never be sure. 
I do not find the hypothesis of a change in perceived riskiness implau- 
sible, however, in view of the fact that most of the drop in q and rise in 
internal rates occurred broadly and sharply in 1973 and 1974  (see table 
2),  rather than gradually over a period of years as one might expect for 
a rise in the actual variance of projected future returns or for a tendency 
to discount with nominal interest rates. Moreover,  the years 1973  and 
1974 were not ordinary years but brought events that shook up investors' 
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ing inflation. If  this hypothesis  is  correct,  the  change  in  perceptions 
should be reversed in due course, which is good news for CREF partici- 
pants, at least for those who do not retire too soon. 
This study also touches briefly on the effect of inflation adjustments of 
reported corporate earnings on market values. In the regression equa- 
tions of table 11 the coefficients on the ratio of inventory valuation adjust- 
ment to cash flow and of replacement cost to book depreciation are gener- 
ally not significant. These variables test whether market values appear to 
depend on reported earnings based on historical cost  accounting or on 
earnings adjusted for replacement costs of capital and inventories. The 
insignificance of the variables suggests that market valuations are based on 
adjusted returns. 
In a current study of mine the results are quite different. Market values 
appear to be influenced by inventory valuation adjustment and replace- 
ment cost depreciation, but only partially; there is closer correspondence 
to book costs than to replacement costs. I cannot account for the differ- 
ence in our results because our regression equations are set up quite dif- 
ferently. But, in any event,  a finding that market values are based on 
reported earnings does not help to explain the drop in q and rise in inter- 
nal rates because the adjustment for replacement costs reduces reported 
earnings during inflation. 
Robert E.  Hall:  This  paper embodies  a staggering investment in data 
gathering and manipulation to give modern theories of market valuation 
a chance to explain the low real value of common stocks. The verdict is 
a strong confirmation of the hypothesis of gross undervaluation of cor- 
porate earnings. All respectable economic explanations of the weak stock 
market are found wanting. In particular, inflation-induced increases in 
effective tax rates cannot fully explain low market values. Only the surge 
in stock prices since the authors began work on the paper threatens to 
undermine its conclusion. As they point out, the current puzzle of under- 
valuation  is  just  part of  a  more  general phenomenon  of  volatility  of 
stock prices in excess of what is explained by the fundamentals. 
The authors work within one of the important conclusions of finance 
theory, the irrelevance of dividends. The market values the profitmaking 
potential of the firm, whether or not the stockholders receive the profit 
as dividends currently. Whatever the firm retains, it can invest and pay 
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pay dividends, it would still be fully valued by the market because the 
firm itself could be sold. But the paper finds finance theory inadequate 
as an explanation of the depressed stock market, so it may pay to look 
at dividends as an added source of information. 
The first thing to notice about dividends is their higher discounting in 
the market of the late 1970s compared to earlier years. The average divi- 
dend yield of the Standard & Poor's 500 rose from 3.2 percent in 1960- 
73 to 4.6 percent in 1974-79.  Second, the fraction of corporate income 
paid out as dividends has declined sharply. The payout ratio from book 
earnings in the Standard & Poor's 500 fell from 55 percent to 45 percent 
from 1960-73  to  1974-78.  According to Brainard, Shoven, and Weiss, 
dividends were 19 percent of gross cash flow in their sample in 1960-75 
and only 13 percent in 1974-77.  Not only are corporations more cautious 
in paying dividends, but the market is suspicious about the value  (that 
is, the potential growth) of the dividends that are paid. 
For  the Standard & Poor's 500,  dividend payouts have fallen to 78 
percent of their earlier levels, and the market valuation of dividends has 
fallen to  69  percent. The product, 53  percent, is representative of the 
current value of  the authors' Z  index of  actual to fundamental market 
values. Similarly, in their sample, dividend payouts from gross cash flow 
have fallen to 67 percent of their earlier values; if, as in the Standard & 
Poor's 500, the market value of dividends is 69 percent of its earlier value, 
the market value of  the sample is 46  percent of its earlier level,  again 
close to the reported change in Z. This adds to my already high confidence 
in the findings of the paper. 
If management had whimsically cut dividends, market value would not 
have changed, finance theory tells us, or value might have risen, because 
of the adverse tax treatment of dividends. Indeed, finance theory tells us 
that dividends ought to be zero on stocks held by owners with higher tax 
rates on dividends than on capital gains. 
Instead of welcoming the cut in dividend payouts, the stock market 
has reacted as if management did not go far enough, so dividends must 
be valued at lower multiples than before. There seems to be something 
that management and the market agree has dramatically worsened the 
financial picture of  the firm, even though it does not show up in gross 
cash flow, book  earnings, or the authors' intrinsic value. Nor,  for that 
matter, does  it  show  up  in higher taxes  or  in  any properly inflation- 
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Franco Modigliani and Richard Cohn blame the declining values of 
firms on two forms of inflation illusion. The rise in dividend-price ratios 
fit their idea  roughly-at  about the  same time, minimal interest rates 
rose. Modigliani and Cohn attribute this to market unawareness of divi- 
dend growth at roughly the rate of inflation, so the market should equate 
dividend yields and real interest rates. The other element of Modigliani 
and Cohn's case is lack of market recognition that much so-called interest 
paid by firms is actually repayment of debt. But book earnings are con- 
servative on this point:  if management is as ignorant as the market, it 
should keep dividends at a constant fraction of book earnings; if man- 
agement is shrewd, it should raise dividends relative to book  earnings. 
Nothing on this account explains the decline in payouts relative to book 
earnings. 
I am convinced by the authors that rising risk or rising discounting of 
risk explain only a fraction of the decline in market values. 
What is left as an explanation? One possibility is that real returns to 
substitutes for stocks-real  estate, direct investment, and financial assets 
other than stocks-have  risen sharply. Certainly, real returns to bonds 
have not risen, and this is a serious obstacle to this line of argument. 
Whatever the explanation of low market values, the lesson seems to be 
to buy stocks. I trust that the authors will send the interested reader a 
list of the ten stocks with the lowest Z for personal investment purposes. 
General Discussion 
Lawrence Summers suggested that the puzzle the authors set out to ex- 
plain is a nonphenomenon. According to Summers' calculations, if per- 
sonal income as well as corporate taxes are taken into account, the ratio 
of after-tax earnings on capital to the market value of debt plus equity 
has actually been fairly constant since 1955. Thus corporate capital as a 
whole is not undervalued. The real puzzle is the relative undervaluation 
of equity compared to debt. The decline in the ratio of the market value 
of capital to before-tax profits can be explained partly by the increase 
in the marginal tax rate caused by inflation and partly by the decline in 
the earnings documented by the authors. Brainard observed that, accord- 
ing to their calculations, it requires approximately a doubling of the real 
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value of bonds plus equity. He wondered whether the implied increases 
in the marginal personal tax rates are plausible, particularly given the in- 
creased importance of pensions and other tax shelters. An  explanation 
that rests on a higher required before-tax return also seems inconsistent 
with the apparent decline in the required real rate on bonds in spite of 
their increased riskiness. 
Summers noted that the estimates of the degree of undervaluation were 
lower the more weight was given to future earnings in calculating present 
values. He observed that there was less of a puzzle to be explained in the 
calculations that assumed the maintenance of  capital than in those  in 
which firms were cashed out; and he suggested that if the authors had 
gone still further and assumed that companies planned to expand their 
capital rather than merely maintain it, they would have further reduced 
the puzzle to be explained. 
Martin Baily observed that the decline in the market valuation of cor- 
porations is so great that there is room for more than one explanation. 
He suggested that the value may appear low because the physical quantity 
of capital that is being valued in the market has been overstated. One 
piece of evidence in support of this view is the fact that measured q has 
remained below unity for a substantial period. Baily found it implausible 
that an accurately measured q would differ from its equilibrium value for 
so long. Overestimation of the capital stock, either because of underesti- 
mation of depreciation on downward biases in the price indexes of capital 
goods, would simultaneously help explain the stock market, the slowdown 
in productivity and growth, and the persistence of  relatively strong in- 
vestment. While agreeing with  the possibility  that the  capital stock  is 
overestimated, John Shoven found  it difficult to  believe  that any such 
overestimation could be large enough to account for the rapid changes in 
the market valuation of firms of the magnitude observed in the late 1960s 
and after 1972. 
Franco Modigliani said that the general conclusion he drew from this 
study is that the discount rate required to explain the market has moved 
roughly with nominal interest rates. His own investigations, which looked 
at changes in the prices of firms during inflationary periods, led to this 
same conclusion. Robert Hall questioned the timing involved in Modi- 
gliani's explanation, noting that it did not work very well before  1972. 
Modigliani acknowledged this  but  said  that  over  the  entire  1965-78 
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owners were not suffering from similar types of inflation illusion. Modi- 
gliani replied that they were actually able to realize the capital gains on 
the underlying asset, houses, whereas stockholders were only able to sell 
their claims on the underlying corporate capital stock, and these claims 
have declined in value with increases in nominal rates from the first in- 
crease in inflation. 
There was considerable discussion of the nature and importance of the 
risks that may be relevant to market valuation. Summers pointed out that 
the authors had looked at the relation between returns on individual firms 
and aggregate corporate earnings plus interest whereas theory suggests 
that the relevant relation is that between the returns on individual firms 
and the returns on all holdings in their portfolios, including human capi- 
tal. He  noted that corporate capital is only  a relatively small share of 
total wealth broadly defined, and it is therefore possible that quite differ- 
ent estimates of the price of risk might result from using his broad con- 
cept of wealth in measuring it. Modigliani reported that there is appar- 
ently no significant relation between changes in the prices of stocks and 
the more conventional beta measures of the risk on total return during 
the two inflationary  periods, 1968-73  and 1973-78. 
William Fellner suggested that investors perceive a different kind of 
risk today from that which is observable in past time-series. According to 
Fellner, investors believe that the inflationary  economy today is untenable 
in the long run, and they are afraid that either an exceedingly uncomfort- 
able period of adjustment lies ahead or an extremely inefficient economy 
with very low productivity growth. 
Alan Greenspan agreed with Fellner that the nature of risks may have 
changed. He suggested that there is a perception of increased risk to the 
property rights that underlie corporate capital. Because there has been no 
apparent relevant change in property rights relating to land or noncor- 
porate capital, this increased risk helps explain the changes in the relative 
valuation of these assets. Brainard agreed that the historical covariation 
of firms' earnings with the aggregate probably does not provide much in- 
formation about the relative vulnerability of those firms to such changed 
perceptions of corporate capital as a whole. He suggested that unless these 
hypotheses could be sharpened to give distinctive implications-for  ex- 
ample, about the differential valuation of firms with different characteris- 
tics  or  the  valuation  of  corporation  capital  in  different countries-it 
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other hypotheses about the market's decline. He  also  said Greenspan's 
hypothesis would be more persuasive if it were more specific about what 
losses of property rights are involved. The current discussions of revisions 
in the corporate tax law, the bailout of Chrysler, and the political climate 
generally do not suggest that corporate capital has suddenly become an 
endangered species. 
Discussion turned to the problem of understanding the strength of in- 
vestment despite extremely low q. Fellner suggested that the signal to the 
firm from a low value of q was partly offset by the firm's ability to borrow 
at low real rates by issuing debt. Modigliani pointed out that even firms 
that were completely equity financed were investing despite the fact that 
the market value  of  such  investments was  lower  than their costs.  He 
noted, in a comment on his view of why equities are undervalued, that 
firms would continue to invest if they make the same error as the market. 
Other comments were directed to specific results. Benjamin Friedman 
said that other studies had found that high yield stocks tend to be under- 
priced whereas this paper implied that the market rewarded large dividend 
payments. Laurence Weiss observed that, in the present sample of firms, 
dividends appear to be positively correlated with future earnings and that 
the estimated effect of dividends on market price is reduced if expected 
earnings are held constant. He  agreed that, given tax law, it is hard to 
understand  why higher dividends should increase a firm's  value for a given 
level of expected earnings. Albert Wojnilower noted that firms that pay 
high dividends tend to hold more financial assets and therefore to have 
lower values during periods of hyperinflation. Summers found it puzzling 
that the authors had not found that inventory profits affect valuation be- 
cause firms with FIFO  pricing practices enjoy the prospects of  higher 
after-tax earnings when they switch to LIFO.  Summers also found the 
tests of the Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis flawed because they had looked 
at the value of equity plus debt whereas he believed the "PINT" variable 
should be used to explain the value of equity alone. Weiss responded that 
the issue was the extent to which the expectations of bonds and stock- 
holders are consistent-whether  the loss from inflation by bondholders 
was perceived as an equal gain by stockholders. This question is directly 
answered  by relating the value of debt plus equity values to PINT. 